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The Role of Satellites and Smart Devices: 
Data Surprises and Security, Privacy, and 
Regulatory Challenges 
Anne Toomey McKenna,*i Amy C. Gaudion,**ii 
Jenni L. Evans***iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Strava, a popular social media platform and mobile app like 
Facebook but specifically designed for athletes, posts a “heatmap” with 
consensually-obtained details about users’ workouts and geolocation. 
Strava’s heatmap depicts aggregated data of user location and movement 
by synthesizing GPS satellite data points and movement data from users’ 
smart devices together with satellite imagery. In January of 2018, a 20-
year-old student tweeted that Strava’s heatmap revealed U.S. forward 
operating bases. The tweet revealed a significant national security issue 
and flagged substantial privacy and civil liberty concerns.  
Smart devices, software applications, and social media platforms 
aggregate consumer data from multiple data collection sources, including 
device-embedded sensors, cameras, software, and GPS chips, as well as 
from consumer activities like social media posts, pictures, texts, email, and 
contacts. These devices and apps utilize satellite data, including GPS, as a 
fundamental component of their data collection arsenal. We call this little 
understood, across-device, across-platform, and multi-sourced data 
aggregation the satellite-smart device information nexus. Given the nature 
of the technology and data aggregation, no one escapes the satellite and 
smart device information nexus. We explain the technology behind both 
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satellites and smart devices, and we examine how the satellite-smart 
device information nexus works. We also address how private industry’s 
aggregation of data through this nexus poses a threat to individual privacy, 
civil liberties, and national security.  
In so doing, we work to fill a marked gap in the privacy and cyber-
related legal literature when it comes to analyzing the technology, 
surveillance capabilities, law, and regulation behind government and 
commercial satellites together with private industry’s aggregation, use, 
and dissemination of geolocation and other data from the satellite-smart 
device information nexus. This lack of awareness about the satellite-smart 
device information nexus has adverse consequences on individual privacy, 
civil liberties, and the security of nation states; it impedes informed 
legislation; and it leaves courts in the dark.  
A contributing factor to the lack of awareness is that commercial 
remote sensing and government satellites are regulated by a byzantine 
scheme of international laws, treaties, organizations, and domestic nation 
states’ laws that combine to control access to satellite data, sharing of 
satellite data, licensing, ownership, positioning in space, technical 
requirements, technical restrictions, and liability for harm caused by 
satellites. Although the satellite-smart device information nexus involves 
staggering quantities of personal information, we examine how the nexus 
falls outside the U.S. electronic surveillance and data legislative scheme 
and why it is unimpeded by privacy decisions due to a disconnect in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions treating aerial surveillance differently than 
location tracking.  
We breakdown the complex yet opaque regulatory structure 
governing commercial remote sensing and government satellites. We 
examine why the Strava event and others like it are—and will continue to 
be—the new norm, absent significant legislative and regulatory change. 
We conclude by providing a suggested roadmap for that legislative and 
regulatory change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Fitbit did that? On January 27, 2018, 20-year old Australian 
international security student Nathan Ruser tweeted: “Strava released their 
global heatmap. 13 trillion GPS points from their users . . . It looks very 
pretty, but not amazing for Op-Sec. US Bases are clearly identifiable and 
mappable.”1 
Instantaneously, Strava, a social media platform and mobile fitness 
app that works with wearable fitness devices, unintentionally 
compromised numerous U.S. special ops bases around the world by 
posting its “heatmap” of user activity online. Strava’s heavily-marketed 
heatmap comprises aggregated data of user movement, developed by 
synthesizing GPS satellite data for the movement data with satellite 
imagery to give these data a geographic reference.2 
On January 30, 2018, The New York Times published a short video 
about Ruser’s tweet; it showed with startling clarity how satellite images 
combined with Strava’s heatmap data revealed multiple U.S. special ops 
bases in remote locations in Djibouti, Afghanistan, and Niger.3 The Times 
interviewed Ruser, who mused from his summer vacation in Thailand, 
 
 1.  Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2018, 10:24 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/ status/957318498102865920.  
 2. See Drew Robb, Building the Global Heatmap, MEDIUM (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://medium.com/Strava-engineering/the-global-heatmap-now-6x-hotter-
23fc01d301de   
 3. Chritiaan Tribert et al., How Strava’s Heat Map Uncovers Military Bases, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://nyti.ms/2DAjwxK (last visited June 20, 2019). 
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“Whoever thought that operational security could be wrecked by a 
Fitbit?”4 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) was left scrambling, and 
the national security and privacy law communities were saucer-eyed with 
dawning comprehension. A social media fitness app simply was not on the 
Pentagon’s radar.5 
To be clear: it is not our intent to imply that Strava did anything 
unlawful or violated its own terms of use and privacy policies. It did not. 
Moreover, Strava provides its users clear options to turn off data sharing. 
But the Strava reveal was a national security debacle and flagged 
significant privacy and civil liberty concerns. How did it happen? We 
explain the data aggregation behind Strava’s heatmap and explain why the 
Strava event is the new norm.6 Smart devices, software applications, and 
social media platforms – like Strava – routinely aggregate consumer data 
from multiple data collection sources, including device-embedded 
sensors, cameras, facial recognition software, and GPS, as well as from 
consumer activities like social media posts, pictures, texts, email, and 
contacts. These devices and apps utilize satellite data, including GPS, as a 
fundamental component of their data collection arsenal. This across-
device, across-platform, and multi-sourced data aggregation is not being 
done by malicious actors, but rather by private industry. Nevertheless, the 
non-malicious aggregation of data poses a threat to individual privacy, 
civil liberties, and national security. 
Law review articles abound that analyze the legal frameworks, ethical 
complexities, and technical know-how behind smart devices, software 
apps, and social media platforms and their data collection, aggregation, 
use, and sale. Likewise, a multitude of articles addressing privacy concerns 
and privacy-law based challenges to satellite-based mapping platforms, 
like Google Earth. However, there is a marked gap in the privacy and 
cyber-related legal literature when it comes to analyzing the technology, 
surveillance capabilities, and law behind government and privately-owned 
satellites together with the role and use of satellites and satellite data by 
the private sector via smart devices and apps. 
The two groups – satellite experts/satellite law scholars on the one 
hand and cyber technology experts/cyberlaw and privacy scholars on the 
other – tend to stay in their own lanes when it comes to analysis of societal 
 
 4. Isabella Kwai, What He Did on His Summer Break: Exposed a Global Security 
Flaw, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2vpTfhh. 
 5. Pun intended. 
 6. Cf, Ryan Pickrell, Satellite Photos Reveal A Strategic Russian Military Upgrade 
on NATO’s Doorstep, TASK & PURPOSE (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:38 AM), 
https://taskandpurpose.com/russian-military-buildup-kaliningrad (describing the use of 
satellite imagery to detect Russian military activity); SHAPE Public Affairs Office, NATO 
releases satellite imagery showing Russian combat troops inside Ukraine, NATO 
NEWSROOM (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:14 PM) https://bit.ly/2L7RjVe (same). 
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and security consequences flowing from acquisition, aggregation, and use 
of data from smart devices, apps, and satellites. Satellites are “up there” 
and governed by space and communications law, while “down-here” 
earth-based activities are governed by domestic legal authorities in the 
fields of surveillance, national security and privacy. 
This gap in interdisciplinary scholarship has significant adverse 
consequences on an unaware public and the security of nation states. The 
Strava debacle made that abundantly clear. Privacy law scholarship has 
not comprehensively addressed questions like: How is government-owned 
satellite data made available to private entities? Who can own satellites? 
Who can access satellite data? How is it that a start-up using aggregated 
data from commercial, publicly available sources, such as satellite data, 
users’ smart devices, and software apps, can create a national security 
crisis overnight? To complicate matters, commercial and government 
satellites are regulated by a byzantine scheme of international laws, 
treaties, organizations, and domestic nation states’ laws that combine to 
control access to satellite data, sharing of satellite data, licensing, 
ownership, positioning in space, technical requirements, technical 
restrictions, and liability for harm caused by satellites. With few 
exceptions, scholarship addressing the law’s regulation of satellites and 
satellite data tends to fall squarely in either the traditional communications 
and space law camp or within technical and privacy scholarship regarding 
satellite technology, capabilities, and advances in these areas. 
II. ARTICLE STRUCTURE AND TERMINOLOGY 
A. Overview of Article Structure 
This interdisciplinary paper begins to fill this void in the scholarship 
and is structured as follows. 
In Section II(B), we address confusion caused by terminology and 
provide a list of defined terms as used in this article. 
In Section III, we provide an overview of the technical capabilities of 
satellites, explain the basics of global position systems (GPS) satellite 
technology, and examine how the private sector uses data derived from 
and generated by commercial remote sensing satellite systems. 
In Section IV, we analyze how smart devices, wearables, apps, social 
media platforms (like Strava), and wireless communications operate off 
the backbone of GPS receivers, microelectromechanical sensors, and 
satellite data. We explore how the private sector harnesses this satellite-
device-software information nexus in ways not fully appreciated by the 
public or policymakers. 
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In Section V, we provide a case study, using the Strava heatmap, to 
demonstrate private sector use of commercial remote sensing and GPS and 
sensor data. 
In Section VI, we provide an overview of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks, at the international and domestic levels, that govern space 
law, satellites, GPS, and the commercial remote sensing industry. 
In Section VII, we provide a summary of the U.S. legal landscape 
governing electronic surveillance technologies, and we consider smart 
devices and satellite-generated and satellite-derived data in the context of 
privacy law, including constitutional concepts and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Finally, we assess the significant privacy and civil liberty 
challenges posed by the proliferation of smart devices, apps, and online 
communication platforms when combined with satellite data. 
In Section VIII, we describe and analyze the specific threats to U.S. 
national security posed by the aggregation of satellite-generated data by 
private sector companies. We explore how and why the U.S. national 
security establishment failed to anticipate these threats, despite a slew of 
regulations that permit the U.S. government to restrict the collection, use, 
and dissemination of satellite data. We examine the shortcomings in the 
current regulatory regime, and we preview pending developments in the 
law. Finally, we explain that the Strava event was only a harbinger of a 
persistent and growing threat. 
In Section IX, we propose a set of recommendations in broad 
brushstrokes to bridge the legal and regulatory chasms in this area while 
grappling with the powerful and transformative role that data from remote 
sensing satellites plays in our daily endeavors. 
B. Terminology7 
In an article tackling technical subjects like satellites, smart devices, 
embedded sensors, and data aggregation from a legal standpoint, our 
research spanned a wide array of research sources and revealed a 
confusing hodge-podge of terminology. The varying terms used by 
engineers, legislators, reporters, legal scholars, technical experts, and 
attorneys – in many cases to describe or refer to the exact same thing – 
leads to continued confusion, lack of understanding, and separation of 
knowledge and disciplines. The term “GPS satellite data,” for example, is 
alternatively referred to as geospatial data, digital geolocation data, 
geodata, GPS, satellite location data, and remote sensing data. 
 
 7. The authors gratefully wish to acknowledge the research and citation assistance 
with this terminology section provided by Benjamin L. Cohen, J.D., Penn State Dickinson 
Law, and Wyatt C. Weisenberg, J.D. Candidate, Penn State Dickinson Law, J.D. 
anticipated May 2020. 
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To alleviate this confusion, the following terms are defined as 
follows: 
5th Generation Wireless (5G) is a new form of wireless networking 
technology which promises download speeds approximately 20 times 
faster than the current 4th Generation (4G) technology. Previously, 
wireless networking operated using the radio-frequency spectrum. 5G 
marks a shift away from the radio-frequency spectrum to the millimeter 
wave spectrum. Unlike the radio waves of prior generations, millimeter 
waves cannot easily transmit through obstacles. 5G wireless thus requires 
a denser number of cell sites. 5G’s denser network of cell sites allows 
increased transmission speeds. 5G simultaneously relies on a traffic-
signaling system to identify the most efficient delivery route. The new cell 
sites transmit information simultaneously across the same frequency. This 
transmission principle can potentially double the capacity of wireless 
networks at their most fundamental physical layer.8 
Cellular phones are two-way telecommunication devices that are 
perhaps best understood as sophisticated radios.9 The root “cell” in cellular 
refers to geographic regions often illustrated as hexagons, like that of a 
bee’s honeycomb.10 Cellular phones contain a low-power transmitter that 
transmits and receives information through a network of cell sites.11 Cell 
phones scan for the cell site that offers the strongest signal in its 
geographic area.12 The cell phone performs these scans every seven 
seconds or when the signal strength from one cell site or tower weakens, 
regardless of whether a call is placed.13 
Cell sites, also referred to as cell towers, sit along areas where three 
hexagonal cells connect.14 Each cell site or cell tower contains a radio 
transceiver and base station controller that receives and transmit verbal 
 
 8. See Charlotte Lee, The 5G Economy: How 5G will Impact Global Industries, The 
Economy, and You, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Mar. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2o9T9V1; see 
also Amy Nordrum et al., Everything You Need to Know About 5G, IEEE SPECTRUM BLOG 
(Jan. 27, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2OV1Dhh.  
 9. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING: 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 28:2 (3d ed. Supp. 2018), Westlaw WIRETAP; see 
also In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750–751 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For a general background on 
cellular telephones, see S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3563. 
 10. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site 
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (describing cellular phone technology). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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communications from one cellular phone to another.15 Cell sites do not 
only process voice data; cell sites also receive location data. 
Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) is a time-stamped record of 
cell phone’s location that is generated each time a cellular phone scans or 
connects to a cell site.16 As noted, cell phones continuously scan for nearby 
cell sites. Cell phones connect to the cell site when placing a phone call, 
sending text messages, and when using a cellular phone application.17 
While the accuracy of the CSLI varies dependent upon the concentration 
of cell sites within a given area, the ubiquity of cellular phones results in 
an increasingly compact coverage areas, and thereby an increasingly 
accurate CSLI.18 With the proliferation of smart phones, mobile apps and 
texting communication platforms, “modern cell phones generate 
increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.”19 The accuracy 
of CSLI is further compounded by the commercialization of location data 
CSLI, incentivizing the cellular providers to store CSLI beyond that 
required by law.20 
Cellular tracking is a surveillance method that uses CSLI to 
determine real-time movement and historical movement (over time) by 
comparing the difference in signal strength from multiple different cell 
sites.21 This process is also known as cellular triangulation and is distinct 
from geolocation tracking, which is defined below. 
Geolocation data refers to digital geographic data and information 
concerning objects or phenomena that are directly or indirectly associated 
with a location relative to the Earth.22 Geolocation data reflects the 
geographical (latitudinal and longitudinal) location of an Internet-
connected device or GPS receiver enabled device.23 Geolocation data 
collected from such devices is used, accessed, and disseminated by a 
variety of apps, and even other smart devices.24  The geolocation data 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018). 
 17. See id. at 2212. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2212.  
 20. See generally id. (noting that wireless carriers often sell aggregated location 
records); Enhanced 911 – Wireless Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/enhanced-9-1-1-wireless-services (last visited June 20, 2019) 
(requiring cell network providers be able to provide relatively precise locations of persons 
placing 911 calls from mobile devices) 
 21. See Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular 
Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 7–10; see 
also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, § 28:4. 
 22. Geolocating Carmen Sandiego, GRAVITATE (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.gravitatedesign.com/blog/what-is-geolocation/.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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collected reflects the geolocation of the device or server, in other words, 
“if you leave your phone in your car and go for an hour-long run in 
silence . . ., your geolocation history for that hour is the physical location 
of your car (according to your phone).”25 In contrast, if “your fitness 
tracker traveled with you the whole time on your wrist, its geolocation 
history for that hour is wherever you ran.”26 Of course, if your phone is 
synced with your fitness tracker or other wearable device, your phone will 
collect the geolocation data from the fitness tracker when the two devices 
next connect. 
Geolocation tracking is a surveillance method similar to cellular 
tracking but relies on GPS satellite data captured and stored by GPS 
receivers, rather than cell-site location data. Geolocation tracking relies on 
a trilateration process, as opposed to triangulation.27 
Geospatial data is data that has a geographic component or includes 
locational information, such as geographic data in the form of coordinates, 
address, city, or ZIP code. Geospatial data can originate from GPS data, 
satellite imagery, and geotagging.28  Geospatial data may also be referred 
to as location data or spatial data and is emerging as an important source of 
information both in traditional and in big data analytics.29 
Geospatial technology refers to the technology used to “acquire, 
manipulate, and store geographic information.”30 Examples of geospatial 
technologies include GPS and remote sensing, among others.31 
GPS satellite data means electronic information about the time and 
position of a GPS satellite.32 
GPS chips or GPS receivers are computer processors that receive 
GPS signals from satellites to determine the device’s geolocation. Devices 
with a GPS chip typically have wireless connectivity which enables the 
device to transmit data to a secondary device, such as a personal computer 
or mobile phone.33 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, 
PCWORLD (Mar. 29, 2010), https://www.pcworld.com/article/192803/geolo.html.  
 28. Caitlin Dempsey, What is the Difference Between GIS and Geospatial?, GIS 
LOUNGE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.gislounge.com/difference-gis-geospatial/.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See What is WAAS?, GARMIN, https://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/waas.html 
(last visited June 20, 2019). 
 33. See Amanda Thomas, How Micro GPS Tracking Chips Work, TRACKIMO (Jul. 26, 
2016), https://trackimo.com/micro-gps-tracking-chips/; see also Daniel Rubino, GPS vs. 
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Assisted-GPS or aGPS is the combined use of GPS along with Wi-Fi 
and cell-tower triangulation (see definition below) to pinpoint the location 
of a device.34 Assisted-GPS pinpoints location very accurately, especially 
indoors where GPS signals might not be strong.35 
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a decentralized network of 
embedded sensors and processors, enabling a range of possible 
communications: person-to-device, device-to-device, or device-to-grid. 
These systems monitor and manage IoT devices.36 
IoT devices are physical objects capable of connecting to the internet, 
similar to other smart devices, with a stronger emphasis on device-to-grid 
communications to enable data analytics.37 
Remote sensing is a method of data collection through instruments or 
sensors that act as a proxy to direct forms of information that rely on 
physical contact.38 
Commercial remote sensing space capabilities as defined in the U.S. 
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy “refers to privately owned and 
operated space systems licensed under the Land Remote Sensing Policy 
Act of 1992, their technology, components, products, data, services, and 
related information, as well as foreign systems whose products and 
services are sold commercially.” 39 
Remote sensing space capabilities are similarly defined in the Policy 
as “all remote sensing space systems, technology, components, products, 
data, services, and related information.”40 Space systems include the 
spacecraft’s remote sensing hardware, software, and cargo as well as the 
spacecraft’s ground stations, command facilities, and the connecting 
networks. Data processing components and exploitation hardware and 
 
aGPS: A Quick Tutorial, WINDOWS CENTRAL (Jan. 3, 2009), 
https://www.windowscentral.com/gps-vs-agps-quick-tutorial. 
 34. See Tracy V. Wilson, How GPS Phones Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
https://bit.ly/2HdZvze (last visited on June 20, 2019).  
 35. See Jules G. McNeff, The Global Positioning System, 50 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
MICROWAVE THEORY AND TECH. 645, 646–647 (2003), https://bit.ly/2VpS5Rq.  
 36. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: MAPPING THE 
VALUE BEYOND THE HYPE 17 (2015), https://mck.co/2gyPezB; see also THE 
HAMMERSMITH GROUP, INTERNET OF THINGS: NETWORKED OBJECTS AND SMART DEVICES, 
(2010), https://bit.ly/2UXcA8u.  
 37. See Mayank Singh, Smart, Connected and IoT Device, ENGINEERING ECKOVATION 
(Jun. 6, 2018), https://engineering.eckovation.com/smart-connected-iot-devices/.  
 38. See 15 C.F.R. § 966.3 (2018) (defining remoting sensing system as applied to 
satellites); 51 U.S.C. § 60101(4) (defining land remote sensing). 
 39. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING 
POLICY FACT SHEET 1 (April 25, 2003), https://bit.ly/2VzywpC [hereinafter REMOTE 
SENSING POLICY].  
 40. Id. 
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software with remote sensing characteristics may also be included in the 
definition.41 
Smart or smart devices are physical objects capable of connecting to 
the internet, either directly or indirectly through a network, to 
communicate information with other networked devices; and have 
computer processing capabilities for collecting, sending, receiving, or 
analyzing data.42 Smart has now colloquially become a prefix used to 
modify a word, signaling that the modified word has some form of 
networking and processing capabilities. Put differently, smart + X refers 
to X with the ability of networking and computer processing. For example, 
smartcity refers to a city that has incorporated networking and computer 
processing technology into its urban environment. 
Smartphones refer to mobile or cellular phones embedded with high-
performance microprocessors and other sensors powered by a mobile 
operating system featuring capabilities like a traditional computer.43 
Software applications, or apps, are software programs that function 
on top of a device’s operating system, allowing the user to perform all 
sorts of tasks from editing documents to playing games. Applications have 
been around for as long as computers, but the term ‘app’ is associated with 
the software that runs on a smartphone or tablet device.44 
Triangulation is the process of determining the coordinates of a point 
based on the known location of two other points. If the direction (but not 
distance) from each known point to the unknown point can be determined, 
then a triangle can be drawn connecting all three points. While only the 
length of one side of the triangle is known at first (the side connecting the 
two known points), simple trigonometry reveals the lengths of the other 
sides and so the position of the third point. In the context of cell site 
information, the two known points are the antenna towers, the third point 
is the cellular telephone, and the direction from each tower to the phone is 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, S. 1691, 
115th Cong. § 2 (2017); SMART IoT Act, H.R. 6032, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); S.B. 327, 
2017 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 43. See What is a smartphone?, LENOVO, https://lnv.gy/2WAIPar (last visited June 
20, 2019). 
 44. See Marziah Karch, A Beginner’s Guide to Apps, LIFEWIRE, (last updated Jan. 04, 
2019), https://bit.ly/2HbzNeK; What is an app?, BBC WEBWISE BLOG, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/0/27488178 (last updated Jun. 2, 2014, 2:26 PM); 
Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/28KjSlG (last visited June 
20, 2019). 
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discerned from the information about which face of each tower is facing 
the phone.45 
 Trilateration is the process of determining the position of a point 
based on the known location and known distance to three other points. 
When a GPS device receives a signal from a satellite, the system calculates 
the distance between the receiver and the satellite, identifying the possible 
position of the device as 
anywhere within the satellite’s 
signal radius. This process 
repeats with another satellite. 
With two signals, the precise 
position could be any of the two 
points where the two circles of 
signal coverage intersect. This 
is still not precise enough, 
leading to a third satellite 
joining the process, revealing 
the device’s precise location 
where all three circles intersect. Each satellite is at the center of a sphere 
with the GPS receiver found in the location where the satellites intersect.46 
Wearable devices describe physical objects such as fitness trackers, 
smartwatches, or smart glasses worn by the user with embedded or 
integrated processors and sensors that are typically networked to a mobile 
device, offering consumers and businesses access to real-time, highly 
personalized information.47 
III. SATELLITES: TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY 
The possibility of integrating remote sensing data into 
local. . .databases and using the databases in conjunction with 
locational GPS data has created opportunities for new types of 
information applications that were not possible using photographic 
remote sensing data alone.48 
 
 
 45. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at § 28:4; see also Trilateration vs 
Triangulation – How GPS Receivers Work, GIS GEOGRAPHY, https://bit.ly/2Q0kfgz (last 
updated Mar. 4, 2019).  
 46. Trilateration vs Triangulation – How GPS Receivers Work, GIS GEOGRAPHY, 
https://bit.ly/2Q0kfgz (last updated Mar. 4, 2019). 
 47. Disrupter Series: Wearable Devices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 2–3 (2016) 
(statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Rep. from Tex.), https://bit.ly/2WwbhtY. 
 48. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, USING REMOTE SENSING IN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: INFORMATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 17 (Nat’l 
Academies Press 2003).  
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After the January 2018 Strava reveal, this 2003 statement from a 
National Research Council report proves prescient. The posting of the 
Strava heatmap, with its immediate national security impact, demonstrates 
this application of locational GPS data from the smart devices onto 
satellite-derived topography and land use backgrounds. This section 
provides a basic overview of the technical capabilities of satellites, 
examines how the private sector uses data generated from commercial 
remote sensing satellite systems, and overviews global positioning system 
(GPS) capabilities. 
A. Satellites and Remote Sensing 
 Satellites work in a similar 
way to the human eye. Neither 
receives information about an 
entire object; they sense the 
presence (or absence) of a feature 
remotely. Touch is direct sensing 
– you are in physical contact with 
the object. Remote sensing is the 
process of acquiring information 
about your surroundings without 
being in contact with it. Both the 
eye and the Earth-orbiting 
satellite sense reflected or 
emitted energy, then process and 
interpret that data into usable information about the world around us.  
 Satellites carry a variety of instruments to capture different parts of 
the energy spectrum, including visible (what you see is what you get), 
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infrared (temperature), and microwave (clouds, rain, ice, snow) parts of 
the spectrum. Using data from more than one of these sensors in 
combination empowers us to distinguish between various types of clouds 
and weather systems, different types of land cover (ploughed fields, 
grasslands, cities, forests, lakes, ocean), and topography. The end result of 
this process is given in 
the Landsat example to 
the right.49 These four 
merged images are 
developed by combining 
information from many 
satellite retrievals of the 
Smoky Mountains in 
each season over 2012 
and 2013 and capture 
seasonal differences in 
vegetation and other 
features. In broad terms, 
this is the process for 
visualizing land surface 
information, such as that 
in the Strava images.  
Aggregation of satellite data by commercial entities includes data 
from satellites in orbits categorized as geostationary, geosynchronous, and 
semi-synchronous. Geostationary satellites orbit above the equator in high 
Earth orbit at an altitude of roughly 36,000 kilometers. This high altitude 
is necessary for the satellite to “sit” in a constant relative location above 
the Earth’s surface and allows the satellite to lie on the same plane as the 
equator. The advantages of geostationary satellites are constant and 
consistent views of the same areas. The disadvantage is that the resolution 
of the satellite is diminished by distance. Geostationary satellites are 
generally used for weather monitoring, and search and rescue beacons.50 
 
 49. Holli Riebeek, How to Interpret a Satellite Image: Five Tips and Strategies, 
NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (2013), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ 
features/ColorImage. 
 50. Geosynchronous vs Geostationary Orbits, GIS GEOGRAPHY (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://gisgeography.com/geosynchronous-geostationary-orbits/. 
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Geosynchronous satellites are located in “a sweet spot above the 
Earth” where the satellite is able to match the Earth’s rotation.52 Thus, a 
geosynchronous satellite’s orbit synchronizes with the rotation of the 
Earth, and it matches the time it takes for the Earth to rotate on its axis - 
23 hours, 56 minutes and 4.09 seconds.53 Geosynchronous satellites move 
in a constant low-Earth orbit, with an altitude of roughly 350 kilometers.54 
The low orbit and proximity to the Earth’s surface allows for higher 
resolution images, and makes geosynchronous satellites particularly useful 
for telecommunications and other remote sensing applications. 55 
Semi-synchronous satellites orbit in a medium Earth orbit located 
approximately 20,200 kilometers above the surface of the planet. Satellites 
in semi-synchronous orbit take approximately 12 hours to complete an 
orbit, twice as fast as the 24-hour cycle for geosynchronous satellites. 
These semi-synchronous satellites make up the global position systems 
(GPS) satellites systems that are critical to the aggregation of locational 
data. 
B. GNSS and U.S. GPS 
To understand how private industries typically interact with satellites 
and satellite data, it is helpful to understand the basics of GPS satellite 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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technology as GPS is one of the most commercially common uses of 
satellites. Before we further describe GPS satellite technology, it is 
important to remember that the Strava debacle was not caused only by 
Strava’s interaction with satellites, but also by Strava’s users’ interaction 
with satellites. This begs the question: how do individuals interact with 
satellites and satellite data? To help answer this question, meet Corey, a 
U.S. citizen residing in the U.S. Like many Americans, Corey uses a 
smartphone and a wearable fitness device. Corey does not exist, but Corey 
does represent the average person. Corey could be you; Corey could be 
me. For illustrative purposes, imagine Corey just purchased the newest 
iPhone. Corey inputs Corey’s home address into the phone’s navigation 
application and begins the journey home. The U.S. GPS system and 
Corey’s smart devices go to work to get Corey home. To understand how 
this happens, we turn back to the satellite systems at play here. What is 
GPS and how does work? 
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the standard 
generic term for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geo-
spatial positioning with global coverage.56 GNSS is a term used 
worldwide, and sometimes used interchangeably with the term GPS 
(Global Positioning System). As discussed more fully below, the major 
GNSS Systems are GPS (U.S.), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (European 
Union), BeiDou (China), and other regional systems.57 
The U.S. GPS is a satellite-
based navigation system owned 
and developed by the U.S. 
Government. The U.S. GPS 
constellation consists of 31 
operational satellites out of 
which 24 are active at any given 
time to cover at least 95% of the 
earth.58 The satellites fly in 
medium Earth orbit at an 
altitude of approximately 
20,200 kilometers,59 as 
 
 56. Michael Venezia, What is the Difference Between GNSS and GPS?, SYMMETRY 
ELECTRONICS (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.semiconductorstore.com/blog/2015/What-is-
the-Difference-Between-GNSS-and-GPS/1550/. 
 57. Id. Access to multiple satellites increases accuracy, redundancy and availability at 
all times; and if one GNSS system fails, GNSS receivers can pick up signals from other 
systems. 
 58. Space Segment, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/space/ (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2019). For more info on technical aspects of the GNSS, see Technical 
Documentation, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/technical/ (last updated Sept. 5, 2018). 
 59. Id. 
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depicted in the diagram of the U.S. GPS constellation.60 The U.S. Air 
Force is responsible for the GPS satellites, and expects to launch its next 
GPS satellite in July 2019. 
GPS satellites are placed into orbits in such a way that any point on 
earth is in the direct line of sight of at least four satellites. GPS satellites 
broadcast radio signals that contain the time and then location of the GPS 
satellites.61 GPS receivers are “chips” that can read the signals that GPS 
satellites broadcast.62 These receiver chips essentially read the digital radio 
signals at the frequency in which the satellites broadcast the digital 
signals.63 GPS receivers read the radio signals from any four satellites from 
which the GPS receiver gets a signal, and then doing some computations, 
the GPS receiver infers its own or its device’s position using trilateration.64 
Thus, the GPS satellites, apart from broadcasting their own location, do 
not take part in the process of gathering geolocation data or geolocation 
tracking.65 
Fortunately for Corey (or for Apple, the manufacturer of Corey’s 
iPhone), civilian use of the U.S. GPS satellite system is free. Because use 
of U.S. GPS is free, numerous private companies develop chips 
compatible with U.S. GPS.66 
How does a smart device use GPS? Recall that Corey is using a 
smartphone to determine directions home. Corey inputs the address into a 
navigation application used by the smart phone. The navigation app uses 
information collected from the GPS chip in the phone to provide Corey 
with the fastest route home.67 The phone’s GPS chip receives digital radio 
signals at the frequency in which the satellites broadcast the digital signals, 
 
 60. Id.  
 61. GPS satellites have atomic clock in them that allow the satellites to keep very 
accurate time and these clocks are adjusted daily to maintain unanimity with time on earth. 
GPS satellites have a decided orbit and it is easy to know their location at any given time. 
Id.  
 62. Patrick Bertagna, How Does a GPS Tracking System Work?, EE TIMES (Oct. 26, 
2010), https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1278363. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS 1, 
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm (last visited June 20, 2019). 
Specifically, for a discussion of trilateration, see id. at 3, 
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps2.htm.  
 65. Wilson, supra note 34.  
 66. Sarah Laskov, The Plane Crash That Gave Americans GPS, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 
3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/the-plane-crash-that-
gave-americans-gps/382204/. 
 67. See Manisha Priyadarshini, Which Sensors Do I Have In My Smartphone? How 
Do They Work?, FOSSBYTES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://fossbytes.com/which-smartphone-
sensors-how-work/. 
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allowing the application to gather relevant time and location data from the 
digital signals.68 
As GPS satellites do not actively participate in location gathering but 
passively broadcast signals for everyone and anyone to read, billions of 
mobile devices and other GPS-chip embedded devices are able to use GPS 
simultaneously.69 Recall the assisted-GPS discussion above. When a 
mobile app is in use, the app is able to utilize assisted-GPS, which is GPS 
receiver chip data in conjunction with Wi-Fi and cell-tower triangulation, 
to precisely pinpoint the location of the device.70 Assisted-GPS pinpoints 
location with precise physical accuracy, especially indoors where GPS 
signals might not be strong. 
As noted, GPS is a system owned and operated by the U.S. 
Government, and the U.S. can selectively decide to deny any nation access 
to GPS data.71 While GPS was initially developed by and for the U.S. 
military, free, worldwide use for civilians was enabled in 1983.72 Initially, 
the U.S. scrambled the signal to limit GPS accuracy for national security 
purposes, but the result was that the U.S. GPS satellites were too 
inaccurate for viable use in everyday commercial activities. In 2000, 
President Clinton made the unscrambled signal available to the public.73 
The U.S. GPS broadcasts in L1 through L5 frequencies.74 Of these, 
the L1 and L5 can be used for civilian purposes whereas the L2 has some 
frequencies dedicated to military use.75 L2 is encrypted and only a device 
with the correct decryption key can access that code.76 The L5 band is a 
newly added band that provides an internationally-protected range for 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. McNeff, supra note 33, at 646–47.  
 70. Wilson, supra note 34.  
 71. Ishan Srivastava, How Kargil spurred India to design own GPS, THE TIMES OF 
INDIA (Apr. 5, 2014), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/How-Kargil-
spurred-India-to-design-own-GPS/articleshow/33254691.cms. The United States denied 
India access to the GPS satellites during the Kargil War in 1999 which led to India 
developing its own satellite system consisting of seven satellites that cover the entire 
landmass of India. Id.  
 72. Allegedly, the U.S. made its GPS satellites free and open to civilian use after 
Russia shot down a Korean civilian airliner that strayed from its flight path and entered 
Russian territory. See Mark Sullivan, A Brief History of GPS, PCWORLD (Aug. 9, 2012, 
7:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2000276/a-brief-history-of-gps.html. 
 73. Juquai McDuffie, Why the Military Released GPS to the Public, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/a26980/why-the-military-
released-gps-to-the-public/; Clinton Acts to Make GPS More Accurate, N.Y. TIMES (May 
2, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/02/technology/clinton-acts-to-make-gps-
more-accurate.html.  
 74. New Civil Signals, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/ 
civilsignals/ (last visited June 20, 2019). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
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aeronautical navigation, promising little or no interference under all 
circumstances.77 In the early 2000s, GPS accuracy was about 20 feet; 
however, since the deployment of satellites using the L5 band, the 
accuracy is  up to 12 inches.78 New GPS receivers using this band can pin-
point location to within a foot, anywhere on earth.79 
Other countries also have GNSS systems or are rapidly developing 
and deploying their own GNSS GPS-like systems. Russia has GLONASS, 
a GNSS system with global coverage,80 and the EU has Galileo. China has 
engaged in rapid development and deployment, launching 18 GPS 
satellites in 2018 
alone, and France is 
also developing its 
own GNSS systems 
for worldwide 
coverage.81 The goal 
– independence from 
the U.S. monopoly on 
GPS. This December 
2018 techcrunch.com 
research graph by 
Arman Tabatabi 
summarizes 2018 
GPS satellite development and launch activity by major nation states.82 
Because the U.S. GPS was the first GNSS satellite system to be made 
available for free use by civilians worldwide, device-manufacturers in the 
U.S and elsewhere, including cellular and smart device manufacturers, 
developed GPS receiver chips that were compatible with the U.S. GPS 
satellites. 
 
 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Samuel K. Moore, Superaccurate GPS Chips Coming to Smartphones in 2018, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/semiconductors/design/superaccurate-gps-chips-coming-to-smartphones-in-2018; 
Jacob Kastrenakes, GPS will be Accurate within One Foot in some Phones Next Year, THE 
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/ 
2017/9/25/16362296/gps-accuracy-improving-one-foot-broadcom.  
 79. Moore, supra note 78. 
 80. Danny Crichton & Arman Tabatabai, The GPS Wars have Begun, TECHCRUNCH 
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/21/the-gps-wars-have-begun/. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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C. The Commercial Remote Sensing Industry and Its Use of 
Satellite Data 
Elevate your perspective. Don’t speculate; quantify. Tap into the 
DigitalGlobe to extract insights and validate critical decisions. 
DigitalGlobe makes valuable location-based information accessible to 
those who need it—anywhere, anytime.83 
That’s one marketing tagline by DigitalGlobe, one of largest 
commercial remote sensing satellite owners and operators. Now that we 
understand how satellites work, this section summarizes the commercial 
remote sensing industry and describes how private companies collect and 
use satellite generated data. In the last few years, significant media and 
scholarly attention has focused on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), or drones by the both private sector and government. While 
UAVs provide a cheap and readily accessible means of aerial surveillance 
and data collection,84 commercial entities have engaged in aerial data 
collection long before drones became part of our lexicon. Private 
companies have been capturing and commercializing satellite data and 
satellite images of our planet for decades.85 
In 1994, the U.S. government granted Lockheed Martin one of the 
first licenses for commercial satellite high-resolution imagery. With that 
license, the company developed IKONOS, the first commercial remote 
sensing system satellite.86 Launched in 1999, it was the first commercial 
satellite to collect high-resolution imagery of the Earth, and to make it 
publicly available.87 Since the 1999 launch of IKONOS, the number of 
commercial actors engaged in the remote sensing industry has expanded 
significantly. The commercial remote sensing services market is estimated 
to reach $21.62 billion by 2022; that growth is being fueled by defense and 
 
 83. Home, DIGITALGLOBE, https://www.digitalglobe.com/ (last visited June 20, 2019) 
(italics added for emphasis). (Taglines on DigitalGlobe’s website change frequently. The 
above tagline appeared in April of 2019.) 
 84. See, e.g., Stephen Rice, Eyes In the Sky: The Public Has Privacy Concerns About 
Drones, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2Hes5iU; Domestic Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/drones/ (last visited June 20, 2019); ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & 
PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONT., PRIVACY AND DRONES: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (2012), 
https://bit.ly/30cngz2.  
 85. See Janna J. Lewis & Lauren R. Caplan, Drones to Satellites, Should Commercial 
Aerial Data Collection Regulations Differ by Altitude?, SCITECH LAWYER, Summer 2015, 
at 10, 10. 
 86. Christopher Lavers, The Origins of High Resolution Civilian Satellite Imaging - 
Part 2: Civilian Imagery Programs and Providers, DIRECTIONS MAGAZINE (Feb. 4, 2013), 
https://www.directionsmag.com/article/1646. 
 87. Id. 
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private sector use of remote sensing services, supported by satellites, as 
well as Big Data applications.88 
Two of the most significant commercial satellite players are 
DigitalGlobe and SPOT Image.89 GeoEye was a third large player, but 
DigitalGlobe purchased GeoEye and all of its subsidiaries and satellites in 
2013.90 These commercial entities use their remote sensing satellites to 
collect various sorts of data, including images, location data, and real-time 
surveillance, and then sell that satellite data to both private sector and 
governments. But the raw satellite data is not the only commodity being 
sold. These companies also aggregate data and provide geospatial analysis 
of the satellite-generated data, and then sell that analysis to app developers, 
social media platforms and government entities. Several examples from 
the commercial remote sensing industry may prove helpful in appreciating 
the scale and scope of the data collection and use. 
91 
Let’s start with DigitalGlobe. The montage above shows differing 
types of images and data captured by DigitalGlobe’s various satellites. 
According to DigitalGlobe’s 2018 brochure, its constellation of satellites 
 
 88. Remote Sensing Services Market Will Worth $21.62 Billion by 2022: Report, 
GEOSPATIAL WORLD (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/remote-
sensing-services-market-will-worth-21-62-billion-2022-report/. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Private Remote Sensing System License Summary of GeoEye-1, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/files/ 
GeoEye1.pdf. [hereinafter GeoEye-1 License]. 
 91. DIGITALGLOBE, THE DIGITALGLOBE CONSTELLATION (2018), https://dgv4-cms-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/file/126/Constellation_Brochure_2018.
pdf.  
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“collects more than one billion sq. kilometers of high-resolution imagery 
per year—building and refreshing the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
high-resolution imagery library in the world as well as offering 
tremendous tasking capacity.” The company explains, “You choose the 
world imagery you need and the way you need it—online, offline, on your 
mobile device or directly into your GIS—and we deliver real-world 
perspective you can rely on.” 
DigitalGlobe’s constellation of satellites92 is noteworthy for several 
reasons. It was the first company to deliver imagery data at full—or 30 
centimeter—resolution to its private sector customers.93 Prior to 2015, the 
U.S. government was the only entity able to obtain full resolution data; all 
other entities received data subsampled down to 50 centimeters.94 In 2015, 
that changed when the U.S. government “cleared” DigitalGlobe “to sell” 
these “clearer, richer”95 images. Because its satellites move in constant 
low-Earth orbit, with an altitude of roughly 600 kilometers, 96 
DigitalGlobe has the ability to capture and the advantage of being able to 
provide its customers much more detailed images of the Earth’s surface. 
The second reason DigitalGlobe’s constellation of satellites is 
noteworthy is that the company is dominating the remote sensing market. 
In 2008, DigitalGlobe signed agreements with Google, Microsoft, Nokia 
and other customers to support their location-based services and mapping 
applications by providing access to DigitalGlobe’s high-resolution 
satellite imagery.97 Look at almost any recent news article involving world 
events, including missile launches by North Korea98 and California’s 2018 
wildfires,99 and the credit below the image will say “provided by 
DigitalGlobe.” In addition to government agencies and news 
organizations, customers for the DigitalGlobe satellite products include 
other commercial data providers, including Mapbox100 and Google 
 
 92. For an overview of the entire system, see DIGITALGLOBE, supra note 91. In August 
2014, DigitalGlobe launched WorldView-3, the company’s eighth satellite at the time. In 
the last five years, DigitalGlobe also launched WorldView-4. 
 93. See About DigitalGlobe, DIGITALGLOBE, 
https://www.digitalglobe.com/company/about-us (last visited June 20, 2019).   
 94. See DIGITALGLOBE, supra note 91. 
 95. About DigitalGlobe, supra note 93. 
 96. See Richard Hollingham, Inside the Google Earth Satellite Factory, BBC FUTURE 
(Feb. 11, 2014), https://bbc.in/1eqRmxQ.  
 97. See About DigitalGlobe, supra note 93. 
 98. See David Brunnstrom, Satellite Images May Show Reprocessing Activity At North 
Korea Nuclear Site: U.S. Researchers, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://reut.rs/2w52542.  
 99. See Tariq Malik, Scale of California’s Deadly Camp Fire Shown in Satellite 
Photos, SPACE.COM (Nov. 11, 2018), https://bit.ly/2H1AEyH. 
 100. See Mark Bergen, Startup Mapbox Makes Big Satellite Imagery Buy to Take On 
Google, Here Maps, VOX (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/ 
2015/10/28/11620110/startup-mapbox-makes-big-satellite-imagery-buy-to-take-on-
google-here. 
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Earth.101 Of note for our Strava case study below, Mapbox is the company 
that created the final product used for the underlying imagery in the Strava 
heatmaps.102 Google Earth relies on multiple sources of images to function 
including satellite, aerial, 3D, and Street View images. Much of the 
imagery in Google Earth is created by stitching together a mosaic of 
multiple satellite and aerial images taken over a span of time. Using a 
mosaic allows Google Earth to present imagery that may have been 
obscured by clouds during the first collection.103 
GeoEye, now owned by DigitalGlobe, provides a further example of 
how the private sector is using data generated by remote-sensing satellite 
systems. GeoEye has a fleet of observation satellites that provide visible 
and near infrared (NIR) images of land and sea at resolutions below one 
meter.104 GeoEye has provided 253 million square kilometers of satellite 
map images to Microsoft and Yahoo! search engines, and in 2013, Google 
obtained exclusive online mapping access to GeoEye’s new GeoEye-1 
satellite.105 In addition, GeoEye was a major supplier of satellite generated 
data to the U.S. government’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.106 
With the purchase of GeoEye’s companies and satellites, DigitalGlobe 
now fills that role. 
Finally, Raytheon’s recent entry into the commercial remote sensing 
field is worthy of a few observations. Raytheon, a defense contractor, 
developed and sells its SeeMe systems for defense and national security 
applications. SeeMe is part of a new wave of remote sensing satellites with 
the capacity to provide real-time imagery. On Raytheon’s website, SeeMe 
is touted as a satellite provided to the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency under the “Space Enabled Effects for Military 
Engagements,” or SeeMe program. Raytheon explains, “the new small 
satellite will allow soldiers on the ground to see real-time pictures of the 
battlefield, which current military or commercial satellites cannot 
provide.”107 But the public summary of Raytheon’s application and the 
commercial license issued by Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory 
Affairs Office of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
 
 101. See How Images Are Collected, GOOGLE EARTH, 
https://support.google.com/earth/answer/6327779 (last visited June 20, 2019). 
 102. Nicki Dlugash, Strava Maps for Runners and Cyclists, MAPBOX: POINTS OF 
INTEREST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://blog.mapbox.com/strava-maps-for-runners-and-cyclists-
dbdb12a279c3. 
 103. See How Images Are Collected, supra note 101. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 2019 THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES 615 
(NOAA),108 an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, presents 
another side to Raytheon’s intended use and commercialization of its 
SeeMe system.109 
In 2015, Raytheon applied for and received a license from NOAA’s 
Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office to launch its 
SeeMe satellite, a private, commercial, space-based, remote sensing 
system.110 The SeeMe Satellite Remote Sensing License Public Summary, 
available on the NOAA website, describes the SeeMe as “the first” of the 
multiple satellites Raytheon is developing that is “capable of quickly 
providing . . . customers with imagery of their surroundings in real-
time.”111 Raytheon’s SeeMe satellite is “about the size of a water cooler 
and is cheaper to make and launch than the typical hardware sent into 
orbit.”112 SeeMe is equipped with “a camera and a telescope,” with a rapid 
orbital period of “about 90 minutes.”113 Raytheon envisions a constellation 
of SeeMe satellites, and one of the company’s vice presidents explained, 
“[w]ith our automated production lines, Raytheon can produce large 
numbers of these highly reliable small satellites quickly and 
affordably.”114 
SeeMe’s small size, mass-scale production potential, affordability, 
and rapid orbital path reflect the rapid technical advancements occurring 
in the commercial remote sensing industry.  When combined with data 
from GPS tracking and smart devices, these advancements result in the 
aggregation of data in real-time with consequences that are hard to 
anticipate or control. To understand how these consequences come about, 
it is helpful to understand GPS satellite technology basics. 
IV. SMART DEVICES 
Smart devices, wearables, apps, social media platforms (like Strava), 
and wireless communications operate off the backbone of satellite data, 
and the private sector harnesses an array of satellite data in ways that are 
not appreciated by the public. 
 
 108. NOAA’s role in regulation, licensing, and compliance enforcement of commercial 
remote sensing activities is discussed below in Section VI.C.  
 109. See infra Section VI.C. 
 110. Raytheon Company: SeeMe Satellite Remote Sensing License Public Summary, 
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/ 
CRSRA/files/raytheon_company_noaa_license_public_summary.pdf. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Small Satellite Work Ramps Up: Diminutive Devices Will Give Troops Real-time 
Battlefield Pictures, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/small_satellites 
(last updated Mar. 05, 2019).  
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A. Smart Devices and GPS Receivers 
As discussed in Section II.B., supra, GPS receivers are “chips” that 
can read the signals that GPS satellites broadcast. These receiver chips 
essentially read the digital radio signals at the frequency in which the 
satellites broadcast the digital signals, and also gather relevant time and 
location data from the digital signals. 
Encouraged by affordability and Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) mandates regarding location requirements for 
emergency services, most phones today have GPS receiver chips. The 
chips are small, inexpensive to manufacture, and consume little power.115 
Because the FCC’s Enhanced-911 regulation mandates that cell network 
providers be able to provide relatively precise locations of persons placing 
911 calls from mobile devices, the FCC E-911 regulation incentivized 
companies to include GPS receivers in mobile devices.116 Using GPS 
satellites, the receiver chips can pinpoint the user’s location without access 
to Wi-Fi or cellular service. For instance, if Corey was using a location 
service app like maps without internet access, Corey would still see a blue 
dot reflecting Corey’s location vis GPS, but the blue dot would appear to 
Corey on a blank map screen because Corey’s iPhone’s map app would be 
unable to download maps to view Corey’s position on the map application. 
Wearable devices have built-in GPS receivers along with multiple 
types of sensors like motion sensors, optical sensors, etc. These wearable 
devices collect relevant data and once they are in contact with a phone via 
Bluetooth or the internet, these wearable devices send the data to the 
application servers, which store the data for processing and aggregation. 
B. Sensor-based Information Systems117 
The recent proliferation of cellular telephones and interconnected 
wearable devices provides a big solution to the limitations in GPS 
technology, albeit in a small size. In the 1980s, researchers developed 
 
 115. Nano Chips Opens New Paths to Smaller Wearable Tech, WEARABLE TECH. DIG., 
https://www.wearabletechdigest.com/nano-chip-opens-new-paths-to-smaller- 
wearable-tech.html.  
 116. Enhanced 911 – Wireless Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/enhanced-9-1-1-wireless-services (last visited June 20, 
2019).  
 117. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research and writing assistance 
in this MEMS sensors section of Wyatt C. Weisenberg, Penn State Dickinson Law, J.D. 
anticipated May 2020.  
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microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors.118 Breaking the word 
microelectromechanical apart provides an easy way to describe MEMS 
sensors: 
micro- the size of the sensor is on the micrometer scale (one-millionth 
of a meter). 
electro- the electric component powers the sensor and records the data. 
mechanical- refers to mechanical functionality, i.e., a component that 
can stretch, deflect, spin, rotate, or vibration.119 
Whereas GPS chips rely on signals from GPS satellites to geolocate, 
MEMS rely on tiny sensors that automatically translate tactile physical 
phenomena into digital information.120 
MEMS sensors are highly sensitive and provide a method of data 
collection with both an accurate spatial resolution and, importantly, a wide 
dynamic range.121 This dynamic range allows the utilization of MEMS 
with multiple sensors, each collecting different kinds of data.122 This 
dynamic range also allows MEMS with multiple versions of the same 
sensors, further increasing the amount and accuracy of data collection.123 
Since the 1980s, both manufacturing costs and the physical size of the 
MEMS have continually decreased, allowing the incorporation of MEMS 
into consumer-products at mass-scale.124 
MEMS sensors are primarily created using silicon,125 which provides 
the MEMS’ sensing abilities.126 Silicon, itself, has many useful properties 
that allow for the inexpensive creation of MEMS sensors in a highly-pure 
 
 118. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 (2014) 
[hereinafter Peppet, Regulating the IoT]. “A MEMS device has electrical and mechanical 
components, which means there must be at least one moving or deformable part and that 
electricity must be part of its operation.” JACOB FRADEN, HANDBOOK OF MODERN SENSORS 
626 (4th ed. 2010) (ebook). 
 119. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364–65, 626–27 (describing MEMS sensors). 
 120. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 99. 
 121. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364.  
 122. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 99; FRADEN, supra note 118, at 
364.  
 123. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364. 
 124. Alexander Wolf, Little MEMS Sensors Make Big Data Sing, FORBES (June 10, 
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2013/06/10/little-mems-sensors-make-big-
data-sing/. 
 125. Note that silicon is a naturally occurring element, not to be confused with silicone, 
which is a synthetic compound that is unrelated to this paper. 
 126. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 607–08 (describing the use of silicon in MEMS 
sensor). 
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laboratory setting.127 MEMS sensors take advantage of silicon’s inert 
physical effects including radiant,128 mechanical,129 thermal,130 
magnetic,131 and chemical.132 Manufacturers utilize silicon’s inert 
characteristics because silicon does not require drastic alterations in order 
to create a sensor that measures these phenomena.133 The nature of silicon 
provides half of the work for the manufacturer. 
In addition to silicon’s inert physical effects, MEMS sensors also take 
advantage of silicon’s distinct physical characteristics during the 
manufacturing processes.134 MEMS sensors rely on a series of microscopic 
and highly-precise mechanical structures.135 Recall that the mechanical 
root in the term microelectromechanical refers to mechanical 
functionality.136 For a visual reference of the scale and nature of MEMS 
sensors’ microscopic and mechanical structures, imagine MEMS sensors 
not as a computer chip. Instead, imagine a wind farm filled with hundreds 
of individual wind turbines each responding to changes in the velocity of 
airspeed. Now take that windfarm and shrink it until it fits on the tip of a 
strand of hair. This is a MEMS system. 
Manufacturers can create these structures using the same thin-film 
and photolithographic manufacturing techniques used when creating 
electronic circuits.137 Naturally, manufacturers that can outfit their 
consumer devices with cutting-edge sensor technology that is highly 
precise, inexpensive, and uses the same manufacturing technique that 
 
 127. See id. The importance of a highly pure and inexpensive manufacturing 
environment cannot be overstated. Accuracy is a core characteristic of any technology that 
relies on sensors.  
 128. Id. Radiant physical effects of silicon include photoconductivity, photovoltaic, 
photoelectric, and photomagnetoelectric effects, i.e., measurements of light and light wave 
properties. 
 129. Id. Mechanical physical effects of silicon include piezoresistivity, lateral 
photoelectric and lateral photovoltaic effects, i.e., measurements of force, pressure, 
vacuum, flow, tilt, thickness. 
 130. Id. Thermal physical effects of silicon include the Seebeck Effect, temperature 
dependence of conductivity and junction, i.e., measurements of temperature, temperature 
gradient, heat, entropy.  The Seebeck Effect is a phenomenon in which heat is directly 
converted into electricity. 
 131. Id. Magnetic physical effects of silicon include magnetoresistance and the Hall 
and Suhi effects, i.e., measurements of magnetic field intensity, flux density, permeability. 
 132. Id. Chemical physical effects of silicon include ion-sensitivity field effects, i.e., 
measurements of concentration, toxicity, pH (acidity) levels, and reduction potentials.  
 133. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364 (describing MEMS sensors). 
 134. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 364–65 (describing the use of silicon in MEMS 
sensor). 
 135. Id. (describing MEMS sensors). 
 136. Id.  
 137. See FRADEN, supra note 118, at 608. 
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company employs when producing electric circuits, will always choose to 
do so. Thus, we see the rise of phones, wearables, and everyday objects 
equipped with MEMS—the rise of the Internet of Things.138 In 1999, 
researchers coined the term “Internet of Things” (IoT) to describe this 
process.139 MEMS sensors are now present in cars, phones, health devices, 
and toys.140 
Cellular telephone and wearable device manufacturers are two 
industries that equip MEMS sensors into their products.141 Although the 
manufacturer advertises the phone’s many features, consumers are 
generally unaware that MEMS sensors are behind many of these new 
features.142 Subsequently, consumers are uninformed of how MEMS 
sensors interact with satellite-based technology. 
Recall Corey’s journey home. Corey is using a navigation application 
that relies on the smart phones GPS chip to read the signals from GPS 
satellites that detail Corey’s location relative to the location of Corey’s 
house.143 The navigation application also relies on MEMS sensors in the 
phone to assist in Corey’s journey. A magnetometer sensor on the phone 
acts as a compass by measuring the direction to the Earth’s ambient 
magnetic field.144 
On Corey’s drive home, Corey accidentally turns too sharply, causing 
the new phone to slide off Corey’s lap. Accelerometers, measuring the 
phone’s amount of acceleration, vibration, and tilt, record the speed Corey 
is driving and the speed of the phone as it slides off Corey’s lap.145 When 
Corey retrieves the phone from the floor of the car, Corey accidentally 
holds it upside down. A gyroscopic sensor, recording the axis of the 
phone’s position, processes this data and automatically re-orients the 
content on the screen from vertical to horizontal.146 
 
 138. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of 
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 699 (2012). 
 139. Duncan McFarlane, The Origins of the Internet of Things, REDBITE (Jun. 26, 
2015), https://bit.ly/2rFx5VY (attributing the coining of the phrase, “Internet of Things,” 
to Kevin Ashton, co-founder of the Auto-ID Center at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology). 
 140. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 98. 
 141. See Kevin Webach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2323 
(2007) (describing the pervasiveness of networked sensors). 
 142. See Peppet, Regulating the IoT, supra note 118, at 145. 
 143. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
 144. See id. The presence of a magnetometer sensor also allows phones to become a 
pseudo-metal detector. See Alexandr Balyberdin, Metal Detector, ITUNES STORE, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/metal-detector/id409682366?mt=8 (last visited June 20, 
2019).  
 145. See Priyadarshini, supra note 67. 
 146. See id. 
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Cell phones are not the only devices equipped with MEM sensors. 
An ever-increasing array of smart devices contain many of the same 
sensors as phones and subsequently record much of the same data.147 After 
successfully retrieving the phone from the car floor, Corey realizes that he 
is about to crash into another car. Corey’s Fitbit, a wearable fitness tracker, 
records Corey’s increased heart rate as he realizes the impending car 
crash.148 The Fitbit lets Corey know that Corey’s heart rate is above the 
average beats per minute and, as Corey’s car is screeching to a stop, 
recommends a guided breathing session to aid in lowering Corey’s heart 
rate.149 
The above hypothetical paints an admittedly incomplete picture of 
the scale of data creation, collection, and analytics following the mass 
integration of MEMS sensors into everyday life. Indeed, MEMS sensors 
surrounded Corey throughout the day, continuously collecting Corey’s 
data. Corey’s wearable device (with which Corey uses the Strava app) is 
embedded with MEMS sensors and a GPS chip. Corey’s car has a host of 
MEMS sensors and a GPS chip–continually connecting with U.S. GPS 
satellites. Corey’s home is replete with smart devices embedded with an 
array of MEMS sensors, GPS chips, and audio-video recording devices all 
collecting Corey and others’ data, including Corey’s doorbell, Corey’s 
vacuum, Corey’s personal assistant device, Alexa, Corey’s smart TV, 
Corey’s laptop, Corey’s printer, Corey’s iPad, and Corey’s refrigerator. 
Corey’s employment place provides no relief from this as Corey is also 
surrounded by MEMS sensor/GPS chip embedded smart devices. 
Researchers estimate that by 2020, approximately 50 billion internet 
capable devices will have internet connectivity.150 Worldwide shipments 
of MEMS is expected to grow to 20.2 billion individual units by 2022.151 
 
 147. Other common sensors include barometers (measures air pressure), proximity 
sensors (measures the distance between an object and the sensor), ambient light sensors 
(allows the device to adjust brightness), oscillators (for the internal clock). See David 
Nield, All the Sensors in Your Smartphone, and How They Work, GIZMODO (July 23, 2017), 
https://gizmodo.com/all-the-sensors-in-your-smartphone-and-how-they-work-
1797121002. 
 148. See generally FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited June 20, 2019). 
 149. See Here’s Why You’ll Love Relax, Fitbit’s New Guided Breathing Experience, 
FITBIT (Aug. 29, 2016), https://blog.fitbit.com/heres-why-youll-love-fitbits-new-guided-
breathing-experience/. 
 150. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, A Simpler World: On Pruning Risks and 
Harvesting Fruits in an Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 27, 27 
(2007). 
 151. David Manners, MEMS to Take 73% of Sensor Market This Year, ELECTRONICS 
WEEKLY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/mems-take-
73-sensor-market-year-2018-09/. 
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The growth of MEMS sensors alters society’s acceptance of the 
incorporation of MEMS sensors into consumer devices and the amount of 
information that is collected. However, MEMS sensors and GPS chips in 
phones and other devices are merely sources of data. 
C. Software Applications 
Smart devices rely on programs and applications to interpret the data 
and allow users to interact with the data.152 While smart devices use 
proprietary programs created by the manufacturer to operate their various 
features, many devices also allow consumers to download applications and 
programs through a marketplace.153 Recall that GPS receivers can 
calculate the location periodically and send it to the apps that have location 
access.154 These apps then use this information to do whatever they need 
the location data to accomplish, e.g., the Strava app.155 
Software developers, like Strava, create programs that use the GPS 
chips and MEMS sensors in the phone.156 The openness of application 
marketplaces, as well as the desire to create the next big application, 
creates an extremely competitive application marketplace, where 
consumer preference trends towards free applications.157 With traditional 
sources of revenue lost, application developers increasingly rely on data 
as a source of revenue.158 
How the phone and device applications interact with these sources of 
data is governed by agreements between the application marketplace, 
usually owned by the device manufacturer, and the developers.159 A 
consumer that downloads the application can further limit the 
application’s access to these sources of information.160 The consumer’s 
ability to limit application access to such information, however, is 
 
 152. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Artyom Dogtiev, App Download and Usage Statistics (2018), BUSINESS OF 
APPS (updated Feb. 16, 2019), http://www.businessofapps.com/data/app-statistics/ (“An 
app store (or app marketplace) is a type of digital distribution platform for smartphone, 
tablet, and software developers.”). 
 154. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Robb, supra note 2 (describing the creation of Strava’s Global Heatmap). 
 156. See id. (describing how Strava created their Global Heatmap through movement 
data provided by their users). 
 157. See Dogtiev, supra note 153 (noting the different types of marketplaces and the 
governance structure). 
 158. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1996). 
 159. See Dogtiev, supra note 153. 
 160. See Advertising & Privacy, APPLE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT205223 (describing application and advertising preferences). 
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hampered by application settings that require the consumer to 
affirmatively act to opt-out—consent is assumed by default.161 
V. CASE STUDY: PRIVATE SECTOR AGGREGATION OF 
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING, GPS, AND SENSOR 
DATA - THE STRAVA HEATMAP 
Strava describes itself as “the social network for athletes.”162 The 
Strava app “syncs with most devices,” including “phone, GPS watch or 
head unit, heart rate monitor or power meter” to record user data and 
performance metrics.163 Strava encourages users to share and upload to its 
platform user pictures and other data about user activities.164 Strava 
provides a feature it calls “Beacon” that, when turned to “on” mode, 
enables Strava users to share their location in real time.165 Beacon and 
other features of the Strava app are heavily dependent on GPS receiver and 
MEMS sensor data collected from synced user devices; this includes its 
trademark heatmap feature.166 The scale of and amount of data depicted in 
the Strava heatmap is impressive: Strava’s heatmap reflects 700 million 
user activities, visualizes 1.4 trillion latitude/longitude points (gathered 
from user synced devices that collect GPS data), and 7.7 trillion pixels are 
rasterized to visually depict over 10 billion miles of user activities.167 
Remarkably, according to Strava, its “full global heatmap was built across 
several hundred machines in just a few hours, with a total compute cost of 
only a few hundred dollars.”168 
In creating its heatmap, Strava compiles data location tracks only 
from users who have consented to their geolocation data being collected. 
However, the default setting appears to be opt-in, and it is unclear if the 
functionality of certain app features is comprised when a user chooses to 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. Features, STRAVA, https://www.strava.com/features (last visited June 20, 2019). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. Uploaded pictures would necessarily include all metadata associated with the 
uploaded digital image file. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. However, it is unclear from Strava’s public information about its heatmap 
construction how much of this data is pure GPS location data or gathered from assisted-
GPS (also using Wi-Fi and cellular location data). As discussed in Part IV, supra, most 
wearable devices and health apps use GPS to determine location at shortly-spaced periodic 
intervals and then upload the data onto the company servers. These devices have internal 
computational capacity to determine speed, elevation, etc. of the users. Further, most of the 
sensing components are independent of the internet, like motion sensors, accelerometers, 
temperature sensors, optical sensor to measure pulse, heartbeat sensors, etc. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
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opt-out of location tracking and sharing. The heatmap depicts a snapshot 
of data aggregated from over a period of two years; and while Strava offers 
real time location tracking via the Beacon feature, the heatmap does not 
reflect activities in real time but only historical data. After the Strava 
heatmap reveal in January 2018, Strava now updates the heatmap every 
month to clear the data of the people who chose to not share their 
location.169 The amount of information accumulated to generate the 
heatmap is about 5 Terabytes; for contextual reference, that is about as 
much data as the Hubble Space Telescope generates in 6 months!170 
Strava accumulates the raw activity data (running, biking, skiing, 
swimming) generated by the participating athletes, then goes through a 
series of steps to “clean up” the data, removing obvious errors.171 
Incompatible corrections for location from other devices (such as GPS in 
smartphones) are addressed to create a quality-controlled activity dataset. 
These data are now accumulated by location into pixels with resolution of 
4 square meters (about 43 square feet). This means that a runner covering 
2 meters in a straight line will have moved from one pixel to another. 
These data are smoothed by a process known as rastering to create paths 
that capture how frequently that path has been used (the path “counts”). 
This is the raw heatmap data. Because we want to see all popular running 
paths, not just those along a bicycle path in the city or a university running 
track, Strava “normalizes” the paths. This means that the largest count value 
in an area about 5 km across is used to scale all of the other counts. For 
example, if 300 people run along the city bicycle path, 150 people use the 
university running track, and 75 people run along a local road, this will show 
up as 1 (hot), 0.5 (moderate) and 0.25 (cool) on the heatmap. Outside of the 
city, there may be only 20 runners along the river, and 5 runners along a 
trail; these values would show up as 1 (hot) and 0.25 (cool) on the heatmap 
for that rural location. In this way, athletes of all types and locations can see 
the popular locations for their sport. 
 
 169. Heatmap updates, STRAVA (Mar. 13, 2018), https://blog.strava.com/press/ 
heatmap-updates/. 
 170. Terabytes, Gigabytes, & Petabytes: How Big Are They?, LIFEWIRE (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.lifewire.com/terabytes-gigabytes-amp-petabytes-how-big-are-they-4125169. 
 171. See Robb, supra note 2. Examples of data that are excluded as errors are: athletes 
who have stopped moving but are still recording their location (which would otherwise 
create a bullseye on a heatmap), runners recording speeds typical of bicyclists, and runners 
or bicyclists recording speeds typical of cars or even airplanes. 
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In this figure of 
the San Francisco 
Bay area, Strava 
activity data has been 
normalized so that a 
wide range of heat 
data is visible in the 
image and values 
have been smoothed 
to change slowly 
across the region so 
that there are no sharp 
boundaries.172 The 
final activity data is 
combined with the 
Mapbox land image 
product (images that 
originated with 
DigitalGlobe) to 
create a highly effective data visualization. 
For purposes of this article and to grasp the complexity of the satellite 
and smart device data aggregation dilemma, it helps to remember two 
aspects of the Strava case study: (1) Strava collects copious amounts of 
user data, in some instances from multiple user-synced smart devices, 
including GPS, assisted-GPS location data using cellular data, along with 
other smart device MEMS sensor data to record intimate health details to 
measure user “performance” and (2) that the copious amounts of data, 
including GPS satellite data, being aggregated by Strava to create the 
heatmap are able to be processed for only a “few hundred dollars” of 
computing costs.173 
When Nathan Ruser tweeted about Strava’s recently published 
heatmap, the complex privacy and challenging national security 
implications resulting from inexpensive aggregation of smart device and 
readily available satellite data were on display for the world to see. As 
reported by The Guardian, in remote locations in Afghanistan, Djibouti 
and Syria, Strava users seem to be “almost exclusively foreign military 
 
 172. See Robb, supra note 2. 
 173. Id. 
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personnel.”174 The end result: covert and forward operating bases stand out 
brightly on Strava’s heatmap.175 
VI. SATELLITES AND REMOTE SENSING: LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The scheme of international laws, treaties, domestic nation states’ 
laws, and organizational bodies that regulate and control satellite 
licensing, ownership, technical requirements, restrictions, and assignment 
of liability is byzantine. In this section, we note key international legal 
authorities governing satellites, address regulation of the U.S. GPS 
system, and then explain the U.S. regulatory and licensing regime for 
commercial remote sensing entities. Aspects of U.S. law that specifically 
regulate satellites from a national security perspective are discussed in 
Section VIII below, because national security-related satellite directives 
are integral to that section’s analysis of the national security implications 
created by satellite proliferation and satellite and smart device data 
aggregation by the private sector. 
A. International Law and Regulation 
The international legal regime governing satellite operations and 
communications is complicated and suffers from a siloed approach. First, 
it includes a body of law governing the use of outer space by governments 
and private actors, the most notable of which are: 1967 Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space (Outer Space Treaty); 1972 Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); 
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention); and 1987 Principles Relating to Remote 
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (UN Remote Sensing Principles). 
Second, the international framework governing satellites includes a body 
of law specific to communications and trade law, and includes the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
While a full discussion of these authorities is beyond the scope of this 
article (and available in other sources176), a few key principles are worth 
 
 174. Alex Hern, Fitness Tracking App Strava Gives Away Location of Secret Location 
of US Army Bases, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-
location-of-secret-us-army-bases.  
 175. Id. 
 176. See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Legal Aspects of Satellite 
Communications—A Mini Handbook, J. TELECOMM. & BROADCASTING L., Sept. 2015, at 1 
(India), available at http://bit.ly/2EcTIrS; Michael R. Hoversten, U.S. National Security 
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discussing. First, the concept of space as a “global commons” or “common 
interest.” This concept is derived from Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, 
which provides that outer space “shall be free for exploration and use by 
all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all 
areas of celestial bodies.” Similarly, Article II provides that outer space 
should not be subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Taken together, 
these provisions undergird the “global commons” principle: the idea that 
“states cannot dictate the activities of others in space.”177 Second, the 
concept of “open skies” is particularly relevant to remote sensing 
activities. Embodied in a non-binding resolution, the “open skies” concept 
permits states to freely sense and distribute data from outer space without 
the consent of the sensed state. 
B. Regulation of U.S. GPS System 
As noted in Section III.B., the U.S. GPS is a satellite-based 
navigation system owned and developed by the U. S. Government. 
Pursuant to 10 U.S. Code § 2281, Global Positioning System, the U.S. GPS 
is regulated and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). 
Section 2281(a) of the Code requires the Secretary of Defense to sustain 
“the capabilities” of GPS and the “operation of basic GPS services”178 for 
the national security interests, and Section 2281(b) specifically directs the 
DOD to sustain and operate the GPS system for “civilian purposes.”179 
Civilian purposes are described as “peaceful civil, commercial, and 
scientific uses,” and DOD is directed to provide access to the GPS system 
“on a continuous worldwide basis free of direct user fees.”180 Under the 
civilian purposes section, the Secretary of Defense is mandated to: 
coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation to develop and augment 
basic GPS to enhance civilian uses of GPS to support of transportation;181 
coordinate with the Secretary of Commerce, the U.S. Trade 
 
and Government Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. 
REV. 253, 260–65 (2001). 
 177. Hoversten, supra note 176, at 261. 
 178. 10 U.S.C. § 2281 (2012 & Supp. 2017) defines “basic GPS services” as: “the 
following components of the Global Positioning System that are operated and maintained 
by the Department of Defense: (A) The constellation of satellites. (B) The navigation 
payloads that produce the Global Positioning System signals. (C) The ground stations, data 
links, and associated command and control facilities.” 
 179. Id. § 2281(b). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. § 2281(b)(2). 
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Representative, and other officials to facilitate development of “new and 
expanded civil and commercial” GPS uses;182 and to develop measures to 
prevent “hostile use of the GPS in a particular area without hindering 
peaceful civil use of the system elsewhere.”183 
It is a tall order: provide free, worldwide GPS satellite access and 
promote new and expanded civil and commercial uses of the system, but 
do not impair national security. The proliferation of GPS-enabled devices 
and the seamless integration of GPS data into app and IOT device 
functioning demonstrates DOD’s successful operation of the U.S. GPS 
system for civilian purposes. Smart devices embedded with GPS receiver 
chips, which use the U.S. GPS system as a means of geolocation, 
necessarily have used U.S. GPS compliant receiver chips. But the 
domination of the U.S. GPS system is under direct threat as China and 
other nations are developing and launching their own GNSS global 
satellite systems.184 While many smart devices are currently manufactured 
embedded with GPS receiver chips compliant and compatible with the 
U.S. GPS system, that is rapidly changing as other nations are achieving 
full coverage with their own GNSS satellites.185 
C. U.S. Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing 
In the U.S., the federal agency that primarily regulates commercial 
remote sensing is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and, to a lesser extent, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).186 For purposes of this 
article, we only focus on NOAA’s regulatory role and not FCC, because it 
is NOAA that operates the Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory 
Affairs Office (CRSRA) and is tasked with licensing and regulating U.S. 
launched, commercially-owned remote sensing space systems.187 It is 
curious and worthy of comment that NOAA, albeit an agency under the 
Department of Commerce, quietly regulates and licenses the U.S.’s multi-
billion dollar commercial remote sensing industry. The average citizen 
more likely associates NOAA with weather and climate science. 
 
 182. Id. § 2281(b)(3). 
 183. Id. § 2281(b)(4). 
 184. See supra Section III.B. 
 185. See supra Sections III.B, IV.A. 
 186. Lewis & Caplan, supra note 85, at 10–11; Compliance and Monitoring, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/ 
complianceHome.html (last visited June 20, 2019). 
 187. See Compliance and Monitoring, supra note 186. 
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NOAA’s CRSRA currently operates under authority from the 
National and Commercial Space Programs Act of 2010188 (NCSPA), the 
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,189 and pursuant to two 
presidential directives: the National Space Policy of the United States of 
America190 (referred to as “U.S. National Space Policy”) and the U.S. 
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy.191 NOAA’s CRSRA can and does 
require specific limitations on the operational performance of commercial 
satellites.192 
NOAA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Regulations are set forth in 
15 C.F.R. Part 960, entitled, Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing 
Space Systems193 (C.F.R. 960). Of note, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and NOAA are currently revising C.F.R. 960, advanced notice of 
rulemaking was published in the Federal Register on June 29, 2018, with 
a goal of a full re-write of commercial remote sensing licensing regulations 
by December 2019. The stated purpose of the complete re-write of C.F.R. 
960 is to “facilitate the continued growth of this critical industry and 
update the regulatory regime to address significant technological 
developments, new business models, and increased foreign 
competition . . . .”194 While this advanced notice of rule-making was 
published in the Federal Register, it was not widely disseminated beyond 
that. During the notice period from June to August 2018, only ten 
comments were received. In reviewing the Advisory Committee on 
Commercial Remote Sensing (ACCRES) notes, there was no discussion 
of privacy and electronic surveillance concerns, the Fourth Amendment, 
or across-device data aggregation implications like the Strava scenario.195 
 
 188. National and Commercial Space Programs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124 
Stat. 3328 (2010) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C.). 
 189. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163 
(1992) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. ch. 601). 
 190. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (June 28, 2010), available at https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/ 
CRSRA/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SPACE POLICY]. 
 191. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39; see also Authorities, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/generalAuthorities.html 
(last visited June 20, 2019) 
 192. Id.  
 193. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960 (2018). 
 194. Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 30592 (proposed 
June 29, 2018).  
 195. See generally 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ADVISORY COMM. ON COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING (Oct. 18, 
2018), 
https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/pdf/ACCRES_24_Meeting_Minutes_final.pdf.  
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We address privacy and national security considerations for these new 
regulations below in Sections VIII and IX. 
NOAA’s CRSRA compliance and monitoring mission is “to facilitate 
the United States commercial remote sensing industry and promote 
collection and widespread availability of Earth remote sensing data, while 
preserving essential U.S. national security interests . . . .”196 In its 
introduction, the U.S. National Space Policy affirmatively acknowledges 
the commercial value and societal changes facilitated by commercial 
satellites in space, characterizing their use as the “now ubiquitous and 
interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world’s growing 
dependence on them . . . .”197 
The 2003 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy, a Presidential 
Directive, also provides authority for NOAA’s CRSRA to regulate and 
support: (1) the licensing and operation of U.S. commercial remote 
sensing space systems; and (2) the United States Government use of 
commercial remote sensing space capabilities. To support its goals, the 
U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy creates a strong and supportive 
marriage between the U.S. Government and private, commercial remote 
sensing actors, specifically stating in the Fact Sheet accompanying the 
Policy that the U.S. Government will: 
 Rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial 
remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and 
geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, 
homeland security, and civil users; 
 Focus United States Government remote sensing space 
systems on meeting needs that cannot be effectively, 
affordably, and reliably satisfied by commercial providers 
because of economic factors, civil mission needs, national 
security concerns, or foreign policy concerns; 
 Develop a long-term, sustainable relationship between the 
United States Government and the U.S. commercial remote 
sensing space industry; 
 Provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment for 
licensing the operations and exports of commercial remote 
sensing space systems; and 
 Enable U.S. industry to compete successfully as a provider of 
remote sensing space capabilities for foreign governments 
 
 196. About Commercial Remote Sensing Compliance & Monitoring, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/complianceHome.html 
(last updated Oct. 11, 2018). 
 197. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190, at 1. 
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and foreign commercial users, while ensuring appropriate 
measures are implemented to protect national security and 
foreign policy.198  
The U.S. National Space Policy specifically and intentionally 
advances commercial remote sensing for domestic society benefits,199 
while simultaneously the NOAA licensing requirements and C.F.R. 960 
mandate that commercial remote sensing companies share data gathered 
from commercial remote sensing activities with the U.S. government. In 
the licensing application process, C.F.R. 960 mandates commercial remote 
sensing licensees to provide detailed information, including data safeguard 
practices and data sharing compliance.200 The NOAA CRSRA regulations 
(C.F.R. 960) provide application filing instructions, and 15 C.F.R. Section 
960’s Appendix 1 denotes specific information that must be included in 
the license application. The “Ground Segment”201 and “Other 
Information”202 sections of Appendix 1 requires licensees to provide the 
U.S. Government with detailed system data collection, data processes, 
upload and download controls, and other detailed information. 
U.S. domestic law provides a regulatory framework that strongly 
supports private commercial remote sensing actors and promotes a close 
 
 198. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39, at 2. 
 199. The U.S. National Space Policy introduction states: “The utilization of space has 
created new markets; helped save lives by warning us of natural disasters, expediting 
search and rescue operations, and making recovery efforts faster and more effective; made 
agriculture and natural resource management more efficient and sustainable; expanded our 
frontiers; and provided global access to advanced medicine, weather forecasting, geospatial 
information, financial operations, broadband and other communications, and scores of 
other activities worldwide. Space systems allow people and governments around the world 
to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with 
assurance. The legacy of success in space and its transformation also presents new 
challenges . . . .” NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190, at 1. 
 200. 15 C.F.R. § 960.4 (2018). 
 201. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 1 (2018). “Ground Systems” information must include:  the 
“system data collection and processing capabilities proposed including but not limited to: 
Tasking procedures; scheduling plans; data format (downlinked and distributed data); 
timeliness of delivery; ground segment information regarding the location of proposed 
operations centers and stations, and tasking, telemetry and control; data distribution and 
archiving plans; the command (uplink and downlink) and mission data (downlink) 
transmission frequencies and system transmission (uplink and downlink) footprint, the 
downlink data rate, any plans for communications crosslinks.”  Id. 
 202. Id. The “Other Information” sections of Appendix 1 require licensees to provide 
NOAA with, “[t]he applicant’s plans for providing access to or distributing the unenhanced 
data generated by the system including: A description of the plan for the sale and 
distribution of such data; The method for making the data available to governments whose 
territories have been sensed; A description of the plans for making data requested and 
purchased by the Department of the Interior available to the National Satellite Land Remote 
Sensing Data Archive for inclusion in the basic data set. . .” Id. 
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relationship between the U.S. government, U.S. national security interests, 
and the commercial sector in space. The policies of strongly supporting 
commercial remote sensing activity in space, while maintaining regulatory 
oversight over and requiring data sharing from the same commercial 
remote sensing actors, foster significant economic growth in the U.S. 
commercial remote sensing private sector. The policies enable the U.S. 
government to harness and share the benefits of the private sector’s rapid 
technical achievements in satellite surveillance capabilities and have 
access to the wealth of data afforded from the same surveillance 
capabilities, while avoiding potential posse comitatus concerns. 
Because commercial remote sensing activity occurs in the “open 
skies” of “space,” the regulation of commercial remote sensing occurs 
wholly distinct from the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme. 
The latter embodies and secures the constitutional right to privacy against 
unwarranted or overly intrusive surveillance by the U.S. government. In 
their current form, commercial remote sensing regulations fail to consider 
or even adhere to U.S. domestic electronic surveillance laws and 
constitutional privacy concerns. But we do so in the next section. 
VII. SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES: U.S. LAW AND 
PRIVACY CONCERNS 
Above, we discussed the impending rewrite of C.F.R. 960, which 
regulates the commercial remote sensing licensing process. The new 
C.F.R. 960 regulations are intended to go into effect in December 2019, 
although at the time this article goes to the publisher, the text of the 
proposed regulations have not been made publicly available. During a 
presentation at the National Space Council meeting in Washington, D.C., 
on Oct. 23, 2018, Karen Dunn Kelley, then acting deputy secretary of 
commerce, announced that the department had just submitted to the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) the draft rule revising C.F.R. 960.203 
Dunn Kelley stated the new C.F.R. 960 “will revolutionize the way we 
regulate the use of cameras in space.” Her comments lauded the 
commercial benefits that would flow from the new rule’s unfettering of 
regulatory restrictions on what commercial actors can do in space, saying 
it would “replace outdated regulation[s] that are slowing down industry 
achievements.” The new rule, she said, would create categories that 
“exempt certain pre-approved activities” from a lengthy license 
application and review process . . .” But Dunn Kelley’s comments made 
no mention of privacy or domestic electronic surveillance, and she did not 
 
 203. Jeff Foust, Revised Remote Sensing Regulatory Rule Nears Release, SPACENEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://spacenews.com/revised-remote-sensing-regulatory-rule-nears-
release/. 
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address in any way the subject of data aggregation from satellites and 
smart devices.204 
While commercial remote sensing is heavily regulated by U.S. 
domestic law, because commercial remote sensing occurs in “space,” its 
regulation has little to no intersection with the long-developed U.S. 
scheme of domestic electronic surveillance and associated jurisprudence. 
But a review of 15 C.F.R. 960’s Appendix 1, the information required for 
licensing requirements, reveals just how much of the data processing and 
data use derived from commercial remote sensing takes place using 
“Ground Systems.” It is a curious disconnect because commercial remote 
sensing companies use satellites to engage in domestic electronic 
surveillance and do so through systems, processes, and algorithms 
obviously tethered to the planet. 
This same hands-off approach to satellite-derived data can be seen in 
the collection or use of GPS-based geolocation data, which largely occurs 
in a regulatory void. The FCC and the FTC classify geolocation services 
as “sensitive information” and urge a heightened need for protection of 
privacy, but such protection is not actually mandated by federal statute.205 
The FTC recommends “just-in-time” disclosures to consumers, which is 
disclosure at the time of collection, to obtain their affirmative consent, and 
it also recommends that apps provide consumers with a privacy dashboard 
and icons indicating that location information is being collected among 
others. If the app collects geolocation data over time, the disclosure should 
not give the impression that it is a one-time collection. 
To fully appreciate the confounding nature of the disconnect in law 
between satellite surveillance and domestic electronic surveillance and 
privacy concepts, we will briefly overview U.S. privacy law concepts and 
the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance laws and jurisprudence. 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH 
TRANSPARENCY (Feb. 2010), http://bit.ly/2M55cnN; Alan Murray, FTC Wants to Beef Up 
Mobile Privacy Disclosures, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/ftc-wants-to-beef-up-mobile-privacy-
disclosures/. 
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A. Constitutional Concepts of Privacy206 
The word “privacy” does not appear in the United States 
Constitution,207 but in their seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The 
Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis framed our modern 
constitutional and common law concepts of privacy.208 In large part due to 
Warren and Brandeis’ article, the U.S. Constitution—despite missing the 
magic privacy word—is the cornerstone of modern privacy law.209 
Common law privacy concepts and the common law right to privacy have 
flowed therefrom and, as evidenced by the amount of civil ligation cases 
asserting invasion of privacy-based claims, the U.S. common law provides 
for a right to privacy. 
There are some marked similarities between the issues presented by 
the satellites, smart devices, and IoT data aggregation and those that 
prompted Warren and Brandeis to write their article in 1890. These issues 
are three-fold: (1) legally unfettered gathering of personal data (2) by 
private industry for commercial gain (3) enabled through advanced 
technologies. In the satellite-smart device-IoT era, these factors combine 
to foster invasions of individual privacy on a scale heretofore 
unimaginable. 
In the 1965 case, Griswold v. Connecticut,210 the U.S. Supreme Court 
first recognized a constitutional right to privacy flowing from rights 
afforded to citizens in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.211 Many of the Court’s decisions 
involving the constitutional right to privacy and enhanced forms of 
government surveillance involve the Fourth Amendment,212 and its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has a long and sometimes convoluted, but 
continually evolving, history. A full overview of this history is beyond the 
scope of this article. But to understand the disconnect that currently exists 
between commercial remote sensing data collection and remote sensing 
 
 206. For a more detailed discussion of the history and development of U.S. privacy law, 
see generally Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 66 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1041 (2013). 
 207. See U.S. CONST.; see also Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State 
Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 218 (1989). 
 208. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 209. See generally id. 
 210. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 211. Id. at 483–85.  
 212. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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data sharing with the government on the one hand, and U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme 
on the other, some background is necessary.213 
In the next sections, we address the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and because commercial remote sensing entities are 
engaged in electronic surveillance and location tracking, and the fruits of 
that surveillance may be shared with the U.S. government by regulatory 
fiat, we also briefly summarize the U.S. domestic electronic surveillance 
statutory scheme. 
B. The Fourth Amendment and a Disconnect in Aerial 
Surveillance/Location Tracking Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, but it applies only to government search and seizure.214 It does 
not apply to private industry or third-party search and seizure.215 For 
decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of 
searches conducted with technology that enhances a human’s own ability 
to see, follow, feel, hear, or smell. The cornerstone of modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and enhanced surveillance technology centers 
around the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the 1967 
Katz v. United States216 case, the Court held that it violated the Fourth 
Amendment to attach a listening device to a public telephone booth. 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence set the stage for a major development in our 
modern-day concept of privacy, which is that one must have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for society and the law to recognize it and protect 
it. 
In the Court’s evolving Fourth Amendment and constitutional 
privacy jurisprudence, willful or knowing disclosure of information took 
on greater significance. If you knowingly exposed something to the public 
or voluntarily turned information over to someone else (a third party), you 
could not claim to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Voluntarily 
turning information over to another formed the basis of the Court’s Third-
Party Doctrine.217  
 
 213. We note that satellite surveillance also poses significant First Amendment 
concerns, but that is for another article.  
 214. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 215. See id. at 117. 
 216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 217. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). The defendant in Smith had 
disclosed the phone numbers he dialed out to the telephone provider. Id. at 745. The Court 
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In its framework of jurisprudence addressing enhanced forms of 
surveillance, the Court has ruled that the government’s warrantless uses of 
wiretaps,218 dog sniffing, 219 thermal imaging,220 attachment and use of a 
physical GPS device,221 and obtaining historical cell site location 
information (CSLI) for tracking purposes222 are all unlawful violations of 
the Fourth Amendment. But the warrantless use of aerial surveillance does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.223 
When it comes to applying this framework of rulings to satellite 
remote sensing data and its aggregation with smart device data, the 
disconnect in the Court’s jurisprudence becomes apparent. One the one 
hand, warrantless enhanced aerial surveillance by law enforcement is 
lawful, while on the other hand, law enforcement’s warrantless persistent 
location tracking by enhanced technologies is unlawful. Specifically, in its 
2018 Carpenter decision, the Court ruled that warrantless location 
tracking via CSLI was unlawful.224 Carpenter was preceded in 2012 by 
the Court’s U.S. v. Jones decision, wherein the Court ruled that the 
warrantless attachment and use of a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s car 
was unlawful. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence frames privacy and civil 
liberties concerns that apply equally to satellite data as well: 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power 
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to 
abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at 
a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered 
discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic 
society.”225  
 
held that this voluntary disclosure to the telephone provider was third party disclosure, and 
thus the data was no longer afforded Fourth Amendment protection. Id. 
 218. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (1967). 
 219. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). 
 220. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 221. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012). 
 222. Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 223. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (ruling that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation when officers flew over a private residence at 1000 feet and took 
photographs after receiving a tip about a marijuana grow operation; Florida v. Riley, 488 
U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (ruling that photographs taken from a helicopter at 400 feet over a 
private residence did not constitute a search); FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, § 30:13. 
 224. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 225. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Cuevas-
Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).  
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The legal conclusions drawn from these two categories of enhanced 
surveillance cases (the aerial surveillance cases and the enhanced, 
persistent location tracking cases), while perhaps rational in the historical 
context in which each decision was reached, pose a head-on conflict. GPS 
satellites combined with smart devices embedded with GPS chips allow 
real-time location tracking. The reality is that commercial remote sensing 
actors, device manufacturers, and apps aggregate, use, disseminate, and 
sell satellite data, GPS chip data, and smart device data and, thus, engage 
in persistent location surveillance. Commercial remote sensing activities 
and capabilities are evolving so rapidly (consider Raytheon’s SeeMe 
satellite) that real-time tracking through images alone is becoming reality. 
In the case of commercial remote sensing entities, U.S. government access 
to the data is permitted by the licensing regulations. 
C. The U.S. Electronic Surveillance Statutory and Data Scheme 
U.S. satellites are governed by space and communications law and 
NOAA’s regulatory oversight, rather than domestic electronic surveillance 
laws, data laws, and constitutional concepts of privacy. We consider 
briefly in this section the U.S domestic electronic surveillance scheme 
because the existing U.S. domestic electronic surveillance scheme 
embodies the Fourth Amendment and privacy protections developed 
through the Court’s jurisprudence, which is discussed in the preceding 
section. In the U.S., electronic surveillance and data protections are 
regulated at both the federal and state levels. While some states, like 
California,226 Illinois,227 and Maryland,228 have enacted laws that afford 
greater data privacy protection and stronger protections from electronic 
 
 226. See California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–
79 (West 2019). 
The California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) applies to commercial website 
and mobile app operators that collect personally identifiable information (PII), which is 
broadly defined by the statute. CalOPPA requires website operators to conspicuously link 
to a Privacy Policy on their website that discloses what type of personal information is 
collected through the online service (website and/or mobile app) and with what third parties 
the collected PII may be shared. There is no overarching federal law that protects PII. 
 227. Illinois passed its Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 14/1–14/99, in 2008. BIPA affords protection to biometric identifying information 
and requires notice and consent for collection of specifically defined biometric identifiers. 
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (West 2019). There is no federal biometric information 
privacy law. 
 228. Maryland’s wiretapping statute, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 
(West 2019), requires all-party consent to recording of communications whereas federal 
law, only requires one party to consent to the recording of a communication. 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(2)(c)–(d) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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surveillance than federal law, in this brief overview, we focus exclusively 
on the federal electronic surveillance statutory scheme.229 Because there 
currently is no overarching U.S. federal data privacy law, and there is no 
specific federal law governing personal data generated by the satellite-
smart device information nexus, we have not overviewed the U.S. data law 
framework.230 As we note in our recommendation section, however, the 
privacy, civil liberty, and national security issues resulting from the 
satellite-smart device information nexus (and its data) demand legislative 
attention. 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)231 regulates the 
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications by government 
and private actors. Through Title III as amended by ECPA, Congress has 
sought to safeguard the privacy of wire, oral, and electronic 
communications and, in particular, the privacy of innocent persons.232 
ECPA forbids the interception of wire, oral or electronic communications 
by private persons unless the communication is intercepted by, or with the 
consent of, a participant, and significantly restricts the authority of law 
enforcement officials to intercept such communications.233 
ECPA, passed in 1986, was an effort by Congress to bring advancing 
electronic communications platforms and technology, including cellular 
phones and location tracking, within the scope of Title III’s protection and 
regulation afforded wire and oral communications.234 For instance, ECPA 
amended Title III’s definition of wire communication by specifying that 
aural transmission constitute wire communication despite the use of radio 
waves and not wires, so long as a switching station creates the connection 
between the sending and receiving phones.235 As noted in the Senate 
Committee report: “[T]his . . . makes clear that cellular communications—
whether they are between two cellular telephones or between a cellular 
telephone and a ‘land line’ telephone—are included in the definition of 
‘wire communications’ and are covered by the statute.”236 
Two federal statutes directly address law enforcement’s use of 
cellular devices as mobile tracking devices: 18 U.S.C. § 3117, entitled 
 
 229. For an in-depth analysis of electronic surveillance law in the U.S., we direct the 
reader to FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9. 
 230. That, too, is the subject of another article.   
 231. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 232.  See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 
801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2177; see also State v. Gilmore, 549 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Wis. 1996) 
(citing FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9). 
 233. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
 234. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at § 1:15. 
 235. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, § 101(a)(6). 
 236. S.Rep. 99-541, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3565. 
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“Mobile tracking devices,”237 which regulates the use of tracking devices 
that move across state lines; and 47 U.S.C. § 1002, part of the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),238 
which we discuss briefly below. In the Mobile Tracking Devices statute, 
ECPA broadly defines “tracking device” to mean “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person 
or thing.”239 
In application of these statutes to cell phones tracking, we also briefly 
mention ECPA’s Pen Register Trap and Trace Statute (the “Pen/Trap 
Statute”),240 which regulates the use of pen/trap devices, and the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA).241 The Pen/Trap Statute governs real-time 
interception of “the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the 
telephone line to which such device is attached.”242 To date, a Rule 41 
warrant based upon probable cause has been necessary to authorize and 
install a mobile tracking device.243 The Pen/Trap Statute only requires a 
certification that the pen/trap device may obtain information relevant to an 
ongoing investigation.244 It specifically provides that: 
a government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap 
and trace device under this chapter . . . shall use technology reasonably 
available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or 
other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or 
electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire 
or electronic communications.245 
 
 237. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 238. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 
U.S.C.). 
 239. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). 
 240. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 to 3127. 
 241. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 242. The Pen/Trap Statute, enacted as part of ECPA, governs real-time interception of 
“dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or 
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, 
that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.”  Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 3126(3), 100 Stat. 1848, 1871 
(1986) (amended 2001). The standard is that of a rubber stamp. See CDT’s Analysis of S. 
2092: Amending the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute in Response to Recent 
Internet Denial of Service Attacks and to Establish Meaningful Privacy Protections, CTR. 
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 4, 2000), 
https://www.cdt.org/files/security/000404amending.shtml. 
 243. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
 244. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 245. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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Information that communication service providers may produce to 
law enforcement pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute is specifically limited 
by CALEA.246 CALEA forbids the provider from producing “any 
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber” 
when the provider is producing call identifying information pursuant to 
the Pen/Trap statute.247 
ECPA’s Stored Communications Act (SCA), found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701 to 2712, authorizes government access to stored communications in 
the hands of third-party providers.248 The SCA categorizes different types 
of stored communications (information) and what the government must do 
to obtain access to those different types of information.249 The protection 
afforded by the SCA to these different types of information is based upon 
the type of stored information sought, i.e. is it addressing or dialing 
information (which is afforded the least protection), or is it “content” 
information (which is afforded the greatest protection from 
surveillance).250 
This brief overview of certain elements of our complex federal 
electronic surveillance legislative scheme is to demonstrate that Congress 
intended, through these laws, to protect U.S. citizens’ electronic 
communications, cellular communications, and location information. 
However, this complex scheme typically does not apply to private 
industry’s tracking of and data aggregation from individuals via the 
satellite-smart device information nexus. We discuss that information 
nexus in more detail in our next section. 
D. Privacy and Civil Liberty Concerns 
Satellite-based information systems and sensor-based information 
systems have merged into an information nexus. The satellite-smart device 
information nexus is best understood as a chain of information collection 
technologies,251 laws and regulations,252 and agreements253 between 
multiple actors. As noted above, the U.S. government provides public 
access to GPS satellites. Phone manufacturers are in essence required to 
 
 246. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 
U.S.C.). 
 247. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). 
 248. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 249. See id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See supra Parts III (describing satellite technology), IV (describing smart device 
technology). 
 252. See supra Parts VI (describing satellite laws and regulations), VII (describing 
smart device laws and regulations). 
 253. See, e.g., APPLE, supra note 160. 
MCKENNA-FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX  
640 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:3 
 
 
equip phones with a GPS receiver.254 Manufacturers increasingly equip 
devices with MEMS sensors. Devices increasingly use third-party 
applications. Third-party applications use GPS receivers and MEMS 
sensors both for the function and as a source of revenue.255 
Unfortunately, these actors are often concerned with only one chain 
of the information nexus at a time. For example, application developers 
who create a GPS application view the nexus through that interaction and 
fail to consider the relationship between the GPS application and the 
device’s MEMS sensors. Manufacturers who equip their MEMS sensors 
similarly view the nexus through that interaction and fail to consider the 
relationship between the sensors and the GPS recievers.256 
The result: data aggregation from commercial remote sensing 
activities combined with smart devices and IoT realities have created a 
dramatically altered privacy landscape with significant national security 
and civil liberties impacts. While scholars agree that privacy norms 
continue to shift with technological advances and the proliferation of 
social media sites and other information sharing platforms,257 the public 
and legislators appear unaware of both the vast surveillance capabilities of 
commerical remote sensing activities and, when combined with data 
aggregated via smart device sensors, the current state of complete 
surveillance of all persons’ locations, physical status, and their proximity 
and relationship to other persons at all times. The continued disconnect 
between the regulation of commercial remote sensing activities, the 
regulation of data aggregation from smart device sensors and IoT devices, 
and current U.S. electronic surveillance law and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions leads to confusion, lack of citizen awareness, and enables 
situations like the Strava case study. 
VIII. SATELLITE DATA AND SMART DEVICES: NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONCERNS 
In the wake of the Strava heatmap incident, many wondered how the 
U.S. Department of Defense was so blindsided? How did it fail to see the 
 
 254. See 10 U.S.C. § 2281(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).  
 255. Compare Robb, supra note 2 (using the smart device’s GPS receiver), with 
Balyberdin, supra note 144 (using the smart device’s MEMS sensors). 
 256. Compare Sarah Williams, More than Data: Working With Big Data for Civics, 11 
I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 181, 192–93, 196 (2015) (failing to note the legal implications of data 
collection), with Cuellar, supra note 150, at 30 (discussing the impact of AI on markets, 
politics, institutions, and societal norms, as well as the need to structure laws in recognition 
of the growth and impact of AI). 
 257. Basil A. DiSipio, Global Positioning Systems and Social Media—Anathemas to 
Privacy, DEF. COUNSEL J., Oct. 2017, at 1, 1–5. 
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impact that the aggregation of satellite data would have on impact national 
security? In our view, there are two main reasons the U.S. government 
failed to recognize or appreciate the scope of the threat. First, the U.S. 
military was focused on different types of threats to satellites—threats 
from malicious actors, threats of physical destruction, and threats from 
cyber operations. The U.S. military did not anticipate or fully appreciate 
the impact that non-malicious aggregation of publicly-available satellite 
data could have on national security. Second, a cumbersome legal regime 
coupled with the U.S. policy promoting private sector ownership of remote 
sensing satellites impeded U.S. national defense entities from identifying 
the harmful impact of GPS and smart device data. This is not a new 
problem. The U.S. government has struggled for years to achieve the 
appropriate balance between national security concerns and commercial 
interests in exploring and using space. Although not new, the struggle is 
more urgent with the coming of 5G networks and increasing number of 
satellites with remote sensing capabilities. 
This section describes and analyzes the specific threats posed by the 
aggregation of commercial satellite data to U.S. national security. It 
examines why the U.S. government was surprised by the Strava heatmap 
incident and failed to anticipate similar threats. It next considers the legal 
authorities that permit the U.S. government to restrict the collection, use, 
and dissemination of remote sensing data in the interest of national 
security, describes the current regime’s shortcomings and previews 
developments in the law. Finally, it explains why the Strava incident was 
not a one-time concern, but reflective of a growing and persistent 
challenge. 
The U.S. civilian economy is “heavily dependent” on satellites for a 
variety of functions.258 Satellite-provided services are so “ubiquitous” that 
we neither notice their origin,259 nor do we fully appreciate the breadth and 
depth of our reliance on the availability, integrity, and reliability of 
satellite-provided data and services.260 Indeed, at least one scholar has 
referred to satellites as the “Achilles heel “ of the U.S. civilian economy, 
noting that any disruption to the availability, integrity, and reliability of 
satellites will have significant—and likely adverse—impacts.261 
 
 258. See Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, The Incremental Militarization of Outer 
Space: A Threshold Analysis, 17 CHINESE INT’L L.J. 45, 54 (2018). 
 259. See David A. Koplow, The Fault is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding An Arms Race in 
Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 332 (2018). 
 260. Id. at 331–32. As Professor Kolpow writes, “[We are] passively unaware of how 
thoroughly our daily activities, and our responses to military crises, have become reliant 
upon a secure, predictable regime of outer space . . . .” Id. at 332. 
 261. See id. at 331 – 37 (“[S]atellites may now be the Achilles heel of the American 
civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus.”); Michael Nayak, CubeSat Proximity 
Operations: The Natural Evolution of Defensive Space Control into a Deterrence 
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Like the U.S. civilian economy, the U.S. military is dependent on 
satellites. It depends on satellite-generated data for communications, 
surveillance, early warning systems, navigation, signals intelligence, and 
meteorology.262 Given this dependence, how did the U.S. military not 
anticipate the threat presented by a company like Strava that was 
collecting, aggregating and sharing data from remote sensing satellites? 
A. The Strava Heatmap: Understanding the National Security 
Impacts from the Aggregation of Remote Sensing Data and 
Smart Devices 
To appreciate the scope of the data aggregation threat, it is helpful to 
be specific about the information the Strava heatmap revealed. On January 
27, 2018, Nathan Ruser’s tweet stated, “If soldiers use the app like normal 
people do, by turning it on tracking when they go to do exercise, it could 
be especially dangerous.”263 It was “dangerous” for a number of reasons.  
However, from a national security perspective, the Strava heatmap created 
four distinct types of security risk. 
First, the heatmap identified the boundaries of previously unknown 
or secret U.S. military bases around the world.264 To put it bluntly, as one 
headline did: “Fitness app Strava lights up staff at military bases.”265 
Second, the aggregation of users’ GPS data into a global heatmap revealed 
patrol routes, as well as military supply and transportation routes and may 
have identified other previously unknown facilities as a user moved from 
a known military base to other military facilities.266 “[T]he bigger worry 
from an operations security standpoint [is] how Strava’s activity data 
could be used to identify interesting individuals, and track them to other 
 
Initiative, SPACE REV. (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2902/1 
(“Foreign policy analysts have not missed this Achilles heel either.”). 
 262. See Grimal & Sundar, supra note 258, at 54. 
 263. Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2018, 10:56 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/957326421684207616.  
 264. See Fitness app Strava lights up staff at military bases, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42853072 (appearing to show the structure of 
foreign military bases in countries including Syria and Afghanistan as soldiers move 
around them); see also Jeremy Hsu, The Strava Heat Map and the End of Secrets, WIRED 
(Jan. 29, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-bases-
fitness-trackers-privacy/.  
 265. See BBC NEWS, supra note 264; see also Liz Sly et al., U.S. military reviewing its 
rules after fitness trackers exposed sensitive data, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://wapo.st/2w5OWrz. 
 266. See Hsu, supra note 264 (“You could for example identify somebody who works 
at a known secret facility and then track his movements to other facilities through which 
he may rotate.”).  
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sensitive or secretive locations.”267 Third, depending on how a user set 
their privacy settings in the app, the interactive capability of the map 
revealed the identities and locations of specific individuals.268 “Once you 
can identify individuals the data becomes a lot more valuable,” said Tobias 
Schneider, a Berlin-based security analyst.269 One Strava user 
demonstrated how to use the heatmap and Google to identify by name a 
U.S. Army major and his running route at a base in Afghanistan.270 
Fourth, and finally, this is not a problem specific to military 
personnel. The heatmap also revealed information about humanitarian and 
aid workers and their routes and operations.271 In 2018, a former 
peacekeeper noted that he was able to use the map to pinpoint the jogging 
route he used when he served with U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan.272 
He used similar sites to identify the names and daily routines of eight 
foreigners working for aid agencies and the United Nations in the Somali 
capital Mogadishu, noting that the “focus of this story has been soldiers 
and spies, but we are also talking about humanitarian workers. If you look 
at what we saw in Mogadishu and you are al-Shabab, you get a pretty good 
idea of who the foreigners are and where they are working.”273 
To be clear, Strava violated no laws in creating the global heatmap or 
in making it publicly available. Likewise, the Strava users who failed to 
use the most rigorous privacy settings when setting up the app did nothing 
illegal, although many have since changed those settings. Rather, the 
consequences of aggregating publicly available GPS data, gathered from 
users of wearable connected devices, came as an unwelcome surprise to 
many. So how did the U.S. military, which is heavily dependent on and 
invested in the use of remote sensing satellite data, fail to appreciate this 
surprise? 
 
 
 267.  Id. (noting that researcher and activist Paul Dietrich claimed to use public data 
scraped from Strava’s website to track a French soldier from overseas deployment back to 
France). 
 268. See Sly et al., supra note 257. To understand why a benign business decision by a 
private company had such an adverse impact on national security, it is important to 
appreciate the individualized nature of the data revealed. Journalists, experts and others 
found ways to use the publicly available Strava data to identify individual users of the 
tracking service by name, along with the jogging routes they use in war zones such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Id. 
 269. Id. (describing a researcher who claims to have identified the names of 573 people 
who jog every morning around the parking lot of the headquarters of British intelligence, 
making it highly likely they work for the agency). 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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B. A Data Surprise: Why the U.S. Missed the Data Aggregation 
Threat 
1. Focusing on Other Threats to Satellites 
First, the U.S. military may have missed the aggregation threat 
because it was focused on threats to satellites of a different nature and type. 
The military was focused on threats from malicious actors, either nation 
states or organized terrorist groups. It was focused on threats of physical 
destruction to its own satellites. It was focused on threats of cyber 
operations against its military and commercially-owned satellites. 
Most government policy statements regarding national security 
threats to satellites focus on malicious actors, either state actors or 
organized terrorist groups. Two recent examples illustrate this perspective. 
The National Air and Space Intelligence Center published Competing in 
Space in December 2018, in which it warned of the increasing capabilities 
of Russia and China in operating remote sensing satellites to support their 
military missions.274 The report stated that “China and Russia have the 
largest remote sensing satellite fleets outside the U.S.”275 The report 
includes graphics on the growing space launch capabilities of Russia and 
China276 and cites concerns about how the increasing use of dual-use 
technologies will “challenge U.S. ability to provide advanced warning of 
nefarious intentions or discern between peaceful and potential hostile 
activity.”277 
Similarly, the U.S. military has been focused on threats of physical 
destruction to its own satellites and to other space objects. Such threats 
include satellite collisions, both accidental and intentional,278 as well as 
the debris fields created by such collisions. Recent examples of physical 
threats include China’s 2007 use of a ground-based anti-satellite missile 
 
 274. See generally NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTEL. CTR., COMPETING IN SPACE 6 (Dec. 
2018), 
http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Documents/Competing%20in%20Space.pdf. 
 275. Id. at 6. 
 276. Id. at 12–13. 
 277. Id. at 25; see also DAVID LIVINGSTONE & PATRICIA LEWIS, CHATHAM HOUSE, 
SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER FOR CYBERSECURITY?, at 9 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-
space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf (listing only threats from 
malicious actors). 
 278. See Brian D. Green, Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or 
Security Threat?, 75 A.F. L. REV. 39, 52–62 (2016). 
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to destroy one of its defunct weather satellites, Fengyun 1C.279 And in 
2013, China launched another missile with the potential to strike targets in 
the geostationary orbit region.280 More recent efforts by China and Russia 
include efforts to develop anti-satellite missiles and counter-space 
directed-energy weapons and to establish networks of ground-based 
sensors to monitor and target the commercial and military satellites of 
other nations.281 
Finally, the U.S. military has been focused on the growing number 
and variety of cyber threats to satellite and space systems. These threats 
are not insignificant, and include threats to the space, user, link and ground 
segments of satellite systems.282 Military planners and strategists worry 
about the real threat of hacking communications or navigational networks, 
targeting or hijacking control systems or specific electronics for missions, 
shutting down satellites, altering their orbits, “grilling” their solar cells 
through deliberate exposure to damaging radiation, redirecting or 
diverting the data the satellite transmits to someone other than its 
owner, operation or intended audience.283 The means are not unique to 
satellites and include hacking, command intrusion, payload control, denial 
of service, introducing malware to cause an abnormality in operations,284 
spoofing, blinding, uplink and downlink jamming.285 In addition, older 
satellites, occasionally referred to as “space junk,” are particularly 
vulnerable to cyber operations.286 
 
 279. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, 
Unnerving U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world 
/asia/18cnd-china.html); see also Chinese Anti-satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital 
Debris Cloud in History, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2007, at 2, 2–3 (Nat’l Aeronautics 
& Space Admin., Houston, Tex.), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-
news/pdfs/odqnv11i2.pdf. 
 280. See Bill Gertz, China Conducts Test of New Anti-Satellite Missile, WASH. FREE 
BEACON (May 14, 2013, 1:46 PM), https://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-
conducts-test-of-new-anti-satellite-missile/. 
 281. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 20–21. 
 282. Id. at 18–19. 
 283. See Patricia Lewis & David Livingstone, The cyber threat in outer space, BULL. 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/2016/11/the-cyber-threat-in-
outer-space/; see also Green, supra note 278, at 25–26. Cyber warfare experts like Gen. 
John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, have warned that China and 
Russia are developing “counter space capabilities” such as electronic jammers and 
advanced signal scramblers specifically to target U.S. military satellites. See Sandra 
Erwin, Senior military official: Space secrets becoming harder to keep, SPACENEWS 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://spacenews.com/senior-military-official-space-secrets-
becoming-harder-to-keep/. 
 284. See Green, supra note 278, at 26. 
 285. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 19. 
 286. See Jan Kallberg, Why older satellites present a cyber risk, FIFTH DOMAIN (Dec. 
28, 2018), https://www.fifthdomain.com/opinion/2018/12/28/why-older-satellites-
present-a-cyber-risk/ (describing the varied ways that malicious actors could take 
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In sum, the U.S. military has been focused, arguably appropriately 
so, on protecting its own satellites from physical or cyber attack by 
malicious actors. These threats should be considered and addressed by the 
U.S. military. However, the U.S. military needs to expand its focus to 
consider a new category of threats, those posed by the non-malicious 
aggregation of commercially-available satellite data. 
2. A Disjointed and Cumbersome Regulatory Regime 
A second reason the U.S. military failed to fully anticipate the threat 
posed by the aggregation of publicly available GPS data is due to the lack 
of a coherent legal regime on how to balance commercial interests and 
national security concerns in space. This is not a new problem. Since the 
initiation of space activities, the U.S. has attempted through legislation, 
regulation, and policy to balance national security concerns while 
promoting the peaceful commercial and research uses of outer space. The 
international community has attempted to strike a similar balance. 
Any discussion of the international legal regime governing satellites 
will highlight five key authorities.287 Three of these authorities form the 
governing treaty law: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the “Outer 
Space Treaty”),288 the 1972 Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”),289 and the 
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space 
(the “Registration Convention”).290 Taken together, these three authorities 
attempt to balance the legitimate national security interests of individual 
nation states with the idea that “exploration and use of outer space . . . be 
carried out for the benefit and interests of all countries . . . and shall be the 
 
advantage of older satellites relying on outdated hardware and software – occasionally 
from 1980s). 
 287. For an overview of the international laws governing remote sensing satellites, see 
supra Section VI.A. See also Hoversten, supra note 176, at 260–265. 
 288. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967, 18.3 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 289. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (requiring 
signatory states to accept absolute liability for damages caused by the state’s satellites to 
Earth and other satellites). 
 290. Convention on the Regulation of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 
1975, 29 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention] (requiring 
signatory states to maintain a national registry of objects it launches into space and report 
such information to the United Nations). 
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province of all mankind.”291 The fourth authority, the 1987 Principles 
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “UN 
Remote Sensing Principles”),292 captured the “open skies” concept, which 
permits states to freely sense and distribute data from outer space without 
the consent of the sensed state.293 A final authority is Article 34 of the ITU 
Constitution,294 which gives states the right to cut off private 
telecommunications activities which threaten national security.295 
The U.S. domestic legal regime attempts this same balancing act with 
regard to the use of remote sensing satellites. The first congressional 
finding in the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 provided that 
“[t]he continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data 
from space are of major benefit in studying and understanding human 
impacts on the global environment, in managing the Earth’s natural 
resources, in carrying out national security functions, and in planning and 
conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social 
importance.”296 Likewise, the regulations governing the licensing of 
private remote sensing systems identify the following as a key purpose: to 
“[a]dvance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests 
by maintaining U.S. leadership in remote sensing space activities, and by 
sustaining and enhancing the U.S. remote sensing industry.”297 This trend 
continues in the recently proposed, but not enacted, American Space 
Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, which states: “It is the policy of 
the United States that, to the maximum extent practicable, the Federal 
Government shall take steps to protect the national security interests of the 
United States that do not involve regulating or limiting the freedoms of 
United States nongovernmental entities to explore and use space.”298 And 
finally, the recent Space Policy Directive-2, issued by President Donald 
 
 291. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 288; see also Hoversten, supra note 176, at 
261 (explaining how the Outer Space Treaty lays the foundation for principles of “common 
interest,” “freedom” and non-appropriation” in space). 
 292. G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space 
(Dec. 3, 1986)[hereinafter UN Remote Sensing Principles]. 
 293. See id. annex, at 2; see also Hoversten, supra note 176, at 260–265. 
 294. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION CONST. art. 34 
 295. See id. (“Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in accordance with their 
national law, any other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the 
security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.”).  
 296. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 2(1), 106 Stat. 
4163, 4163 (1992) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. ch. 601). 
 297. See 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (2018).  
 298. See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. § 4(b) (2017). The bill passed out of the House of Representatives, and was referred 
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate in April 
2018. See Actions Overview H.R. 2809—115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2809/actions (last visited June 
20, 2019). 
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Trump in May 2018, provides: “It is therefore important that regulations 
adopted and enforced by the executive branch promote economic growth; 
minimize uncertainty for taxpayers, investors, and private industry; protect 
national security, public-safety, and foreign policy interests; and 
encourage American leadership in space commerce.”299 
To protect the national security side of this scale, the U.S. 
government relies on a number of specific legal and policy authorities to 
restrict space activities that pose a threat to national security. These 
authorities include: the Remote Land Sensing Policy Act of 1992300 and 
subsequent amendments, codified at 51 U.S.C. Chapter 601; the 
implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R. Part 960; U.S. Commercial Remote 
Sensing Policy (dated April 25, 2003);301 the National Space Policy of the 
United States (dated June 2010),302 the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act of 2015,303 which amended Title II of the Remote 
Land Sensing Policy Act; the Memorandum of Understanding Among the 
Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Interior, and the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, Concerning the Licensing and 
Operations of Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems (dated April 25, 
2017);304 and Space Policy Directive-2 on “Streamlining Regulations on 
Commercial Use of Space” (dated May 24, 2018).305 
While a full review of these authorities is beyond the scope of this 
article, we will focus on a few provisions with significant national security 
bite. As noted in Section VI supra, U.S. law requires owners and operators 
of private remote sensing space systems, including satellites, to secure a 
license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. The licensing authority 
 
 299. Space Policy Directive-2: Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space, 
83 Fed. Reg. 24901, 24901 (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-2] 
 300.  Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163 
(1992). 
 301. REMOTE SENSING POLICY, supra note 39. The 2003 policy superseded Presidential 
Decision Directive 23, U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space 
Capabilities (March 9, 1994), and urged the U.S. government to develop strong 
relationships with private sector entities in the remote sensing industry while ensuring 
appropriate protection of national security and foreign policy initiatives. Id. 
 302. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 190. 
 303. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015). 
 304. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Departments of Commerce, State, 
Defense, and Interior, and the Office of the Deflector of National Intelligence, Concerning 
the Licensing and Operations of Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems (April 25, 
2017), https://bit.ly/30b3bsQ [hereinafter Remote Sensing MOU].  The 2017 MOU seems 
to replace an earlier MOU among these departments, dated February 2, 2000, although it 
does not expressly say so. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 2 (2018). 
 305. Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 299. 
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is executed by NOAA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs 
Office. Thus, the first national security checkpoint for remote sensing 
satellites comes in the license application process. The Department of 
Commerce’s general licensing authority requires consultation with other 
appropriate U.S. government agencies, including the Department of the 
Defense when the license application is first submitted to ensure 
consideration of national security concerns. “No license shall be granted 
by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines in writing that the 
applicant will comply with . . . any . . . national security concerns of the 
United States.”306 The nuts and bolts of the interagency review process that 
identifies, considers and assesses the national security interest is provided 
in the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding.307 
A second national security lever occurs when NOAA sets the initial 
conditions for the license. The regulations require that the licensee 
“operate its system in a manner that preserves the national security” and 
notes that the government may place limitations on the satellite’s 
operational performance, “including, but not limited to, limitations on data 
collection and dissemination.” 308 In addition, the regulations require the 
licensee to maintain operational control of the satellite from a location 
within the U.S. with command override ability.309 
A third national security check can occur either at the outset or during 
the license term. As part of the monitoring and compliance process, or due 
to changing national security circumstances, the government may require 
the licensee ”to limit data collection and/or distribution by the system as 
determined to be necessary to meet significant national security or 
significant foreign policy concerns.”310 In addition, the government may, 
when “necessary to meet significant national security” interests, require 
the licensee to provide “unenhanced restricted images on a commercial 
basis exclusively to the U.S. Government.”311 
 
 306. 51 U.S.C. § 60121(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also 15 C.F.R. § 960.6(f) 
(2018) (“[n]o license shall be granted by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines, in 
writing, . . . that the granting of such license and the operation of the license and system by 
the licensee would be consistent with the national security interest . . . of the United 
States.”). 
 307. Remote Sensing MOU, supra note 299. 
 308. 15 C.F.R § 960.11(b)(1) (2018); see also 51 U.S.C. §§ 60122(b)(1), 60147(a) 
(2012 & Supp. 2017) (“The Secretary and the Landsat Program Management shall consult 
with the Secretary of Defense on all matters under this Act affecting national security. The 
Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for determining those conditions, consistent with 
this Act, necessary to meet national security concerns of the United States and for notifying 
the Secretary and the Landsat Program Management promptly of such conditions.”). 
 309. 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(2). 
 310. Id. § 960.11(b)(4). 
 311. Id. 
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A fourth and final national security touchpoint occurs in the reporting 
requirement. An important but often overlooked provision requires annual 
reports to Congress on various aspects of the licensing and enforcement 
provisions.312 This reporting provision requires the Secretary of 
Commerce to submit an annual report to the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives.313 
Among other items, the annual report must include a list of all applications 
for remote sensing licenses received in the previous calendar year, a list of 
all applications that resulted in a license for a remote sensing space system, 
and a list of all applications denied, as well as an explanation of why each 
application was denied, including any information relevant to the 
interagency adjudication process.314 
It is worth noting that the authorities listed above do not identify a 
specific type of national security threat, nor do they describe the scale, 
scope, or nature of the national security interest. Taken together, however, 
they provide a mechanism for the Department of Defense, and other 
national security entities, to identify and respond to national security 
concerns relating to the collection, use, access, and dissemination of 
imagery gathered by remote sensing satellites. More specifically, these 
provisions—in conjunction with the implementing regulations and 
executive branch policy statements315—form the legal basis for the 
national security-related restrictions that the U.S. government places on 
privately-operated remote sensing satellites. These restrictions generally 
fall into four categories: (1) limitations on the operational performance of 
the satellite;316 (2) requirements for reporting, monitoring, and 
compliance;317 (3) limitations on foreign involvement in the U.S. remote 
sensing and satellite industry;318 and (4) limitations on data collection and/
 
 312. See 51 U.S.C. § 60126 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 313. Id. § 60126(a). 
 314. Id. 
 315. 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 2 (2018) (“In consultation with affected agencies, 
limitations on commercial remote sensing systems will be imposed by the Secretary of 
Commerce when necessary to meet international obligations and national security and 
foreign policy concerns and will be in accord with the determinations of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of State and with applicable law”). 
 316. 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(1) (2018). 
 317. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 960.11(b)(3) (detailing a licensee’s reporting requirements). 
 318. See 15 C.F.R. § 960.8 (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. §  2274(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 amended 10 U.S.C. §  
2274(a) by specifying  when the Secretary of Defense  can share SSA data, who can DOD 
share that data with, who must pay, and issues of civil and criminal immunity. See The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-844, 123 Stat. 
 2019 THE ROLE OF SATELLITES AND SMART DEVICES 651 
or dissemination, often referred to as “shutter control.”319 This allows the 
U.S. government to prohibit images of a certain resolution, to prohibit 
imaging over a particular geographic location, and to restrict the clarity of 
the commercially available images when publicly released.320 
C. The Limits of the Current Regulations and New 
Developments 
Despite the seemingly broad reach of the national security restrictions 
on the collection and dissemination of satellite data, as described above, 
in practice they have limited application. The limits fall into three 
categories. First, a jurisdictional limit: the national security protections 
limit only U.S. companies subject to U.S. laws and regulations. While the 
regulations include restraints on foreign investment in U.S. satellite and 
remote sensing companies, there is nothing to prevent a foreign company 
from collecting, using, and sharing with others the data that the U.S. 
government identified as impacting national security interests.321 Indeed, 
some have argued that the U.S. regulatory scheme actually accelerated the 
growth of satellite and remote sensing industries abroad. According to 
James Vedda, a senior policy analyst at Aerospace Corporation, “[a]ll 
you’ve really done is drive business to those foreign companies.”322 The 
second category relates to criticisms of the inter-agency process for 
 
2190. The Secretary of Defense has since delegated this authority to the Commander of the 
U.S. Strategic Command. See Green, supra note 278, at 63–64.  
 319. For an overview of these protections, see Hoversten, supra note 176, at 270–79. 
See also RICK HEIDNER, SHUTTER CONTROL: AN APPROACH TO REGULATION IMAGERY FROM 
PRIVATELY OPERATED RS SATELLITES (May 15, 2014), https://bit.ly/2yNcRzc; Sarah 
Scoles, How The Government Controls Sensitive Satellite Data, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2PYekZG; Hamed Aleaziz, Why Google Earth Can’t Show You Israel, 
MOTHER JONES (June 10, 2011), https://bit.ly/2YkobvM. A notable example of geographic 
imaging restrictions occurred in 1997, when “Congress passed the annual National Defense 
Authorization Act, one section of which was titled, ‘Prohibition on collection and release 
of detailed satellite imagery relating to Israel.’ The amendment, known as the Kyl-
Bingaman Amendment, permitted a U.S. government agency, NOAA’s Commercial 
Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs, to regulate the dissemination of zoomed-in images of 
Israel.” Aleaziz, supra (emphasis omitted).  
 320. See 51 U.S.C. § 60121(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also 15 C.F.R. § 960.6(f) 
(2018). See also Scoles, supra note 319; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1064, 110 Stat. 2422, 2653 (1996) (Kyl-Bingaman 
Amendment). According to an October 2018 meeting of ACCRES, the U.S. currently 
limits imagery over Israel to “coarser than 2 meters GSD.”  See Samira Patel, NOAA’s 
Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 
9 (Oct. 2018), https://bit.ly/2Lz7MC6 (slide deck). 
 321. COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 7. 
 322. See Scoles, supra note 319; see also COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 6. 
The development of remote sensing satellite industry in other countries and the 
developments in imagery has reduced the ability of countries to perform sensitive military 
operations undetected. 
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seeking input and approving licenses. Complaints abound about long 
license processing times and a lack of transparency as to the reasons for 
license denials or limitations on data collection and dissemination. Similar 
complaints point to ineffective monitoring and compliance reports. A third 
limit is the outdated nature of the licensing scheme that is tasked with 
regulating an industry at the forefront of technological development and 
advancement. The current regulations were last updated in 2006, which 
was more than a decade ago and prior to the introduction of Apple’s first 
iPhone. 
Given these limits, it should come as no surprise that efforts at reform 
are coming from all quarters. In 2015, Congress passed the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 with the 
objective of facilitating a pro-growth environment for the development of 
a commercial space industry by encouraging private sector investment and 
creating more stable and predictable regulatory conditions.323 Recent 
legislative efforts have echoed this focus on encouraging private 
investment and improving the regulatory landscape, and have included the 
proposed American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017324 and 
Space Frontier Act of 2019.325 Both included provisions aimed at 
shortening the duration of the license application process and providing 
greater clarity to license applicants.326 
Indeed, the executive branch has been active as well. In May 2018, 
President Trump issued Space Policy Directive-2, titled “Streamlining 
Regulations on Commercial Use of Space.”327 Section 3 of the directive 
tasks the Secretary of Commerce with reviewing—and possibly revising 
or rescinding—the licensing regime for commercial remote sensing 
systems,328 regulations which were adopted pursuant to Title II of the Land 
 
 323. See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).  
 324. American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, H.R. 2809, 115th Cong. (2018). 
This bill passed the House and was referred to the Senate in April 2018. See Actions 
Overview H.R. 2809, supra note 298. It would provide for a faster licensing timeline and 
put the burden on the government to prove why a company shouldn’t get a license, rather 
than on a company for proving why it should. See also Scoles, supra note 319. 
 325. Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 3277, 115th Cong. (2018). This bill passed the 
Senate but failed in the House. Actions Overview S. 3277—115th Congress (2017-2018), 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3277/actions 
(last visited June 20, 2019). 
 326.  DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: 
FEDERAL REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION, at 9 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/space/R45416.pdf. 
 327. See Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 299.  
 328. Id. at 24901–02 
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Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (51 U.S.C. Chapter 601), and which 
were last updated in 2006, almost fifteen years ago. 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross wasted no time, and in June 2018, 
the department published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.329 
The comment period ran through the end of August 2018. According to 
ACCRES meeting minutes, NOAA received a whopping total of 10 
comments during the 2 month period, with the comments generally 
focused on improving transparency in the licensing process, and 
transitioning from a “one size fits all” model.330 According the Advisory 
Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing, an entirely new set of 
regulations has been drafted and was sent to the Office of Management 
and Budget for review in late October 2018.331 NOAA’s goal appears to 
be to publish final rules by the end of 2019.332 
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the need for a 
comprehensive “regulation re-write”333 of the commercial remote sensing 
licensing scheme. The advance notice identified “ambiguities in the 
current regulatory regime, many of which were unforeseeable even just a 
few years ago” and offered the following specific examples: 
 Dramatic increase in the number of license applications 
 Increasing remote sensing capabilities in other countries 
 Cubesat constellations 
 Non-Earth imaging 
 Satellite servicing 
 Innovative systems capable of imaging in different spectral 
bands 
 Live video broadcasting from space 
 Venture capital investment, including significant amounts 
from foreign nationals and corporations 
 New entrants to space markets 
 Hosted payloads 
 
 329. Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 30592 (proposed 
June 29, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 960); see also MORGAN, supra note 326, at 
9.  
 330. 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note 195, at 3.  
 331. See Foust, supra note 203; 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note 
195, at 3. 
 332. 24th Meeting of the ACCRES Committee, supra note 195, at 3.  
 333. See Patel, supra note 320, at 3.  
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 Increasing use of public-private partnerships 
 Complex contractual relationships 
 Satellite servicing missions, including proximity operations 
 Ground station networks located in multiple countries with 
different regulatory regimes 
 Launch vehicles imaging on orbit.334  
It is interesting to note that the list did not mention the aggregation of 
geolocation data, the increasing number of sensor-based devices using 
commercial remote sensing data, such as IoT connected devices, or the 
advent of 5G networks. Nor were the Strava or Polar global activity maps 
referenced. 
Not surprisingly, the private sector owners, operators and users of 
satellite data have not shied away from criticizing the current regulatory 
landscape. In 2016, DigitalGlobe CEO Walter Scott called for a rethinking 
of the regulatory regime for RS satellites, and a reset of the national 
security-commercial development balance, writing: 
It’s time for the U.S. government to rethink the basic premise 
underlying commercial remote sensing regulation. Instead of focusing 
solely on the risks, acknowledge the benefits that widely available U.S. 
commercial satellite imagery bring to national competitiveness. 
Acknowledge that commercially available satellite imagery has proven 
to be a great social benefit. Acknowledge that the U.S. space 
technology edge has eroded, and satellite imagery is now available 
from dozens of countries. Acknowledge that the feared dire risks from 
the commercial availability of satellite imagery never materialized. 
Acknowledge that U.S. industry has been very forward-leaning in 
protecting national security through self-policing. Acknowledge that 
the world has changed.335  
To put it bluntly, the legal framework governing remote sensing 
satellites was complicated, jurisdictionally limited, and arguably 
ineffective in spotting national security interests before “sensored” 
wearable devices and IoT products became features of our daily lives; 
before commercial entities had the ability to aggregate geolocation and 
other data from multiple app-based sources; and before recent advances in 
enhanced imagery resolution, including increased pixelization. Thus, it 
 
 334.  Licensing Private Remote Sensing Space Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. at 30592. 
 335. Walter Scott, U.S. Satellite Imaging Regulations Must Be Modernized, 
SPACENEWS (Aug. 29, 2016) https://bit.ly/2He6sQV.  
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may be an understatement to suggest that the regulatory regime is at a 
breaking point. 
D. Data Aggregation Is a Persistent and Growing Concern 
The national threat posed by commercial remote sensing data is not 
decreasing or going away. The number of remote sensing satellites 
operated by the United States public and private sectors is growing.336 
Foreign states are similarly increasingly turning to remote sensing 
satellites.337 In 2008, there were 100 satellites with this capability; by 
2018, there were 300 remote sensing satellites.338 The number of countries 
and multinational organizations that own or operate satellites is increasing 
due to the increasing commercialization of space and affordable space 
technology. Satellite ownership is no longer limited to a few space power 
countries. In 2018, more than 50 countries and multinational organizations 
owned or operated satellites.339 This persistent and growing challenge is 
one that will only increase with the advent of 5G technology. 5G will 
increase the number of satellites in orbit, expand the number of sensors 
gathering – and sharing - geolocation and other data. 5G networks will 
create civilian and military enterprises “teeming with constant rivers of 
data.”340 And to top it off, China and other nations are developing quantum 
computing satellites, with the capacity to capture and process vast amounts 
of imagery data.341 
Although the sections above examined how the U.S. military missed 
the threat posed by aggregation of geolocation data and their data-driven 
apps, it is important to note that not everyone in the U.S. government 
missed the potential national security threat. A 2017 GAO report identified 
“the geolocation capability of some IoT [Internet of Things] devices as a 
particular concern—specifically, how the location of troops or personnel 
could be revealed.”342 However, this recognition did not prevent the Strava 
heatmap incident in January 2018. Nor did it prevent a similar incident 
 
 336. See supra Part III.C.  
 337. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, and accompanying text. 
 338. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 1. 
 339. See id. at 2. 
 340. See John P. Thomas, 5G From Space: 20,000 Satellites to Blanket the Earth, 
TECHNOCRACY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/2UEtpA9. 
 341. See COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274, at 8. 
 342. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-668, INTERNET OF THINGS: 
ENHANCED ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS SECURITY RISKS IN 
DOD 18 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686203.pdf; see also Jacob Meschke, 
Pentagon Severely Restricts Fitness Trackers After Strava Heatmap Scandal, BICYCLING 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://bit.ly/2VtPMg7.  
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with a global activity map prepared by Polar Fitness343 in July 2018. Using 
the data from Polar’s Explore map, one could locate sensitive military sites 
and find a user’s name and address, and users included military personnel 
from various military and intelligence agencies.344 
Quite possibly, the significance of the national security information 
revealed by the heatmaps incidents may have provided the awakening 
moment – or at least more concrete recognition – by the U.S. national 
security establishment as to the scope and contours of a new type of threat: 
a threat posed not by the direct actions of malicious states or groups, but 
by simple commercial interests and a consumer desire for efficiency and 
convenience. “The rapidly evolving market of devices, applications and 
services with geolocation capabilities presents a significant risk to the 
Department of Defense personnel on and off duty, and to our military 
operations globally,” said Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Robert 
Manning III on August 6, 2018.345 Thus, the question going forward is 
how will the U.S. stem the “rising river of digital metadata” in a way that 
protects national security interests, and relatedly, how will it prevent 
malicious actors from dipping into that river of data.346 
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations offered below are nascent in scope and require 
further consideration and development. However, the broad brushstrokes 
seem appropriate as we work to bridge the legal and regulatory chasms in 
this area while grappling with the powerful and transformative role that 
remote sensing data plays in commercial, individual, and military 
endeavors. We make these recommendations as a launching point for 
further discussions and as a framework to begin development and eventual 
implement of proposed policy and regulatory changes. We do so with full 
understanding that any act that interferes with or disrupts the availability, 
integrity and reliability of satellites and satellite data will have significant 
impacts on our civilian and military realms. 
  
 
 343. See Andrew Liptak, Polar Fitness Suspends its Global Activity Map After Privacy 
Concerns, THE VERGE (July 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2KWo2LG.  
 344. See id. 
 345. See Jim Garamone, New Policy Prohibits GPS Tracking in Deployed Settings, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Gz1vAy.  
 346. See Patrick Turner, Strava’s Just the Start: The US Military’s Losing War Against 
Data Leakage, DEF. ONE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/2vqCemM.  
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Number 1: Revise the International Space Object Registry to 
require more detailed and publicly available information about data 
collection, use, aggregation, and dissemination. 
We start with our most practical recommendation. Space object 
registries should add requirements mandating that the owner/operator: (1) 
identify the data that will be collected; (2) specify the intended use for the 
data; (3) identify the entities with which the data will be shared or 
disseminated; and (4) make that information transparent and publicly 
available, wherever feasible. The lack of transparency in the current 
international framework makes it difficult to anticipate, appreciate, or 
respond to the privacy and national security risks presented by aggregation 
of satellite generated data. 
The U.N. maintains a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
more colloquially referred to as the Space Object Register.347 The Register 
was initially “established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the 
political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space” and has 
become “a means of identifying which States’ bear international 
responsibility and liability for space objects.”348 To be included in the 
Register, the owner or operation must complete the “Registration 
Information Submission Form,” available on the United Nations Register 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space website, hosted by United Nations 
Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) website.349 The two-page form 
requires only limited information on the launching state, the designator, 
the date and territory or location of the launch, the basic orbital parameters, 
any change of status, and the “general function of the space object.”350 
There is no requirement to provide information as to the specifics of the 
satellite’s function, or the type, use or dissemination of the data it will 
gather.351 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 347. See United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE 
FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://bit.ly/2atzZrq (last visited June 20, 2019).  
 348. See id. 
 349. See Registration Information Submission Form, U.N. REGISTER OF OBJECTS 
LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE (Jan. 1, 2010), https://bit.ly/2UVRmIh.   
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. 
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Number 2: Revise the U.S. licensing regime for commercial 
remote sensing space objects to make the full licenses publicly 
available absent significant concerns about national security or 
international obligations. 
The U.S. licensing regime for private remote sensing space systems 
requires a significantly greater level of detail,352 including applicant 
contact information (including foreign owners and lenders), launch 
segment information, space segment information; ground segment 
information; as well as other information. In particular, the application 
requirements are quite robust and include: “system data collection and 
processing capabilities”; “data distribution and archiving plans”; “plans 
for providing access to or distributing the unenhanced data generated by 
the system”; “a description of the plan for the sale and distribution of such 
data”; and a “method for making the data available to governments whose 
territories have been sensed.”353 
The U.S. regulations require the license applicant to include specific 
information in the application about data collection, use and 
dissemination. Similarly, the regulations require the U.S. government to 
include specific information in the approved license regarding data 
collection, use and dissemination. However, the detailed information 
about data collection, use and sharing generally is not available to the 
public. Instead, the regulations require only that public summaries of 
current commercial remote sensing licenses be posted on the Commercial 
Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs website.354 The summaries tend to be 
less than one page in length, and lack detailed information about how the 
satellite will collect, use, or share data. 
For example, there are three public license summaries available for 
DigitalGlobe on the CRSRA website. Each summary provides information 
about the launch dates, orbital parameters, and image resolution.355 
However, the public summaries contain no information about the use or 
dissemination of the imagery data being collected. There is one interesting 
statement in the public summary for the GeoEye Imagery Collection 
System: “Due to U.S. licensing restrictions, commercial customers may 
 
 352. See Filing Instructions and Information, 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 1 (2018). 
 353. See id.  
 354. See NOAA Licensees, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2J04Bk3. 
 355. See GeoEye-1 License, supra note 90; Private Remote Sensing System License 
Public Summary (DigitalGlobe WorldView system), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN. (2006), https://bit.ly/2XKj87x; Summary of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space 
System License (DigitalGlobe), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (2017), 
https://bit.ly/2Pu5QJt. 
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only receive imagery from GeoEye-1 at half-meter or greater ground 
resolution.”356 
The need for classification is understandable in many instances, 
however, there are also instances when the full license can be made 
publicly available, and in those instances, it should be. Commerce 
Secretary Ross identified streamlining the regulatory process and 
providing greater transparency to license applicants as priorities. That 
transparency should be extended to the public so they understand how the 
data being collected and shared—or sold—by the license applicant may 
affect their privacy. 
 
 Number 3. Ensure that aggregation of satellite geolocation data 
is on the agenda of international dialogues about cyber governance 
and international security frameworks. 
In 2018, the U.N. celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first United 
Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
In the coming years, the Liability Convention and Registration Convention 
will also celebrate 50 years. It is an opportune moment to ensure that 
international dialogues about the use of outer space, satellites and remote 
sensing include discussions of data aggregation, privacy interests and 
national security. 
Future international dialogue should build upon the 
recommendations of the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on 
Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space 
Activities as expressed in its concluding report,357 published in July 2013. 
Other international entities particularly well-poised to consider the issues 
discussed in this article include the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the Context of International Security, and the U.N.’s Working Group on 
the “Space2030” Agenda. 
Historically, these working groups and discussions have focused on 
armed conflict scenarios in space and the weaponization of space objects 
to achieve military ends. It is critical that these discussions move beyond 
the armed conflict and use of force paradigms to appreciate the significant 
threat posed, not by malicious nation state actors or rouge terrorist 
organizations, but by the simple business decisions of private sector 
entities with access to incredible amounts of satellite sourced data. 
 
 
 356. GeoEye-1 License, supra note 90. 
 357. G.A. Ses. 68/189, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (July 29, 2013), 
https://undocs.org/A/68/189.  
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 Number 4: Ensure that U.S. policymakers understand the 
scope and scale of threats posed by the satellite-smart device 
information nexus and amend the relevant U.S. authorities to correct 
the disconnect between constitutional privacy, domestic electronic 
surveillance laws, and satellite regulation. 
Despite tremendous press coverage of the Strava incident, and recent 
legislative efforts to revisit the balance between commercial interests and 
national security,358 the U.S. government has failed to appreciate the 
complexities posed by the commercial use, aggregation and sale of 
satellite data. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy did not 
include the word “satellite” or the term “remote sensing,” nor did the 2018 
Summary of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.359 The 2018 
National Cyber Strategy used the word satellite only once. In a section on 
improving space cybersecurity, the strategy provided: “The 
Administration is concerned about the growing cyber-related threats to 
space assets and supporting infrastructure because these assets are critical 
to functions such as positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); satellite 
communications; and weather monitoring.”360 The December 2018 
“Competing in Space” report, prepared by the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center, did discuss satellites and remote sensing, however, it 
focused on physical and cyber threats from malicious actors, notably 
China and Russia.361 The Competing in Space report did not discuss the 
Strava or Polar incidents, nor did it discuss how to address the cresting 
wave of remote sensing data related to IoT and 5G. 
We do not mean to the suggest the U.S. government is willfully 
ignoring the problem. It is not. After the Strava and Polar incidents, the 
Pentagon responded to the specific threat posed by the use of wearable 
devices with geolocation features by servicemembers. On August 3, 2018, 
the Pentagon issued a DOD Policy Memo that announced: “Effective 
immediately, [Defense Department] personnel are prohibited from using 
geolocation features and functionality on both non-government and 
government-issued devices, applications, and services while in locations 
designated as operational areas [].” 362 The memo directs prompt 
 
 358. See supra, Part VIII, section B.3., See also generally MORGAN, supra note 326.  
 359. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER 
STRATEGY (2018), https://bit.ly/2OCwui5.  
 360. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 10 (Sept. 2018), https://bit.ly/2xrQ0XK.   
 361. See generally COMPETING IN SPACE, supra note 274. 
 362. See Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Chief Mgmt. Officer of 
the Dep’t of Def. et al., Use of Geolocation-Capable Devices, Applications, and Services 
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development of geolocation risk management guidance and training and 
mandates an update of the annual Cybersecurity Awareness training to 
educate DoD personnel the risks posed by geolocation capabilities 
embedded in devices and apps.363 Similarly, the GAO identified these 
specific concerns in a July 2017 report, noting that “the geolocation 
capability of some IoT [Internet of Things] devices as a particular 
concern—specifically, how the location of troops or personnel could be 
revealed.”364 
The Pentagon’s prohibition, however, does not address the actual 
problem. It fails to grasp the satellite-smart device information nexus, and 
it bizarrely assumes that individuals are capable of controlling 
“geolocation features and functionality” on a myriad of highly 
sophisticated smart devices and apps. While the Pentagon policy changes 
and the GAO reports are important developments, we are urging a larger 
rethinking and recognition of the problem by the U.S. government. 
Specifically, the U.S. government must take concrete actions to 
understand and address the threats discussed in this paper. 
First, on the policy side, those working on future National Defense 
Strategy and Cyber Strategy documents must examine and address the 
security challenges and civil liberties concerns posed by remote sensing 
satellites. Likewise, given the President’s recent space-related 
directives,365 we anticipate a new U.S. Space Policy document, designed 
to replace the 2010 policy, is in the works. The new space policy document 
must address the privacy and national security concerns posed by data 
aggregation from remote sensing satellites. In a similar vein, NOAA’s 
Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing (ACCRES) must 
broaden its perspective to embrace both commercial interests and privacy 
and civil liberties concerns. According to its website, ACCRES “evaluates 
economic, technological, and institutional developments relating to 
commercial remote sensing” and serves as “a forum for the discussion of 
issues involving the relationship between industry activities and 
 
(Aug. 3, 2018), http://bit.ly/2EiQovh [hereinafter Geolocation Memo]; see also Garamone, 
supra note 345; Meschke, supra note 342.  
 363. See Geolocation Memo, supra note 362; see also Garamone, supra note 345. 
According to news stories, the DoD is also considering limiting the apps that 
servicemembers can use, mandating devices that show which apps allow third-party 
siphoning and banning personal smartphones in the Pentagon, similar to the ban at CIA 
headquarters. The DoD’s Defense Information Systems Agency, which serves as the 
military’s IT department, is charged with leading this effort. See Tara Copp, Fitbits and 
Fitness-tracking Devices Banned for Deployed Troops, Military Times (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/08/06/devices-and-apps-that-
rely-on-geolocation-restricted-for-deployed-troops/. 
 364. See Meschke, supra note 342.  
 365. See National Space Council Directives, OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCE (2019), 
https://bit.ly/2Pu6TZI. 
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Government policies, programs, and regulatory requirements.”366 The 
threat posed by aggregated satellite data to privacy and national security 
must be part of its wheelhouse, and ACCRES’s committee membership 
must include privacy and domestic surveillance experts. 
Second, regulatory change is needed. A November 2018 CRS asked 
whether and how the commercial space licensing process could be made 
simpler, timelier, and more transparent.367 The response offered is telling: 
Congressional attention to this question has focused, in large part, 
on the process for interagency consultation on commercial 
remote sensing licenses. The challenge for that process is 
balancing industry’s need for timeliness and transparency with 
the government’s need to meet national security and foreign 
policy objectives. The rapidly advancing capabilities of foreign 
government and commercial satellites make identifying the 
appropriate balance more difficult, because if sensitive imagery 
can be obtained elsewhere, prohibiting U.S. companies from 
providing it may have few security benefits.368 
Nonetheless, the on-going 15 C.F.R. 960 “re-write” of the 
commercial remote sensing licensing scheme should try to strike the 
balance correctly. The new rules should address the rapid and mind-
binding technological developments that have exposed ambiguities in the 
current regulatory scheme. In the addition, the new regulations should: 
make the full license application and approved license publicly available 
to the greatest extent possible; extend the annual congressional reporting 
requirement, which is set to sunset in 2020; add an unclassified executive 
summary, available to the public, as part of the annual report to Congress; 
revise the license application requirements to specify data type, collection 
method, whether and how the data will be aggregated with other sources 
(if known), and how the data will be sold or disseminated. 
Third, specific changes are needed in the legislative realm. The 
disconnect between satellite regulation and domestic privacy and 
electronic surveillance law must be addressed by Congress. 
Comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. electronic privacy and surveillance 
statutory scheme is long overdue. As we continue to move rapidly into 5G 
platforms, smart cities, and our interconnected IoT universe, the satellite-
smart device information nexus must be part of the regulatory and policy 
 
 366. See Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2Vj8U12 (last updated Oct. 11, 2018). 
 367. See generally MORGAN, supra note 326. 
 368. Id. at 24. 
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framework. Satellites, generally, and commercial remote sensing, 
specifically, provide the technical underpinnings and data that enable these 
systems to function. But satellite-smart device data aggregation is not part 
of our domestic privacy and electronic surveillance data framework. The 
satellite-smart device information nexus must be part of our data law 
framework. Here are two immediate steps to be taken: the FY20 National 
Defense Authorization Act drafting process is well underway: in its 
funding, planning and response, the NDAA must address the threat posed 
by aggregation of satellite-smart device information nexus. Next, 
Congress should to reintroduce and pass the Geolocation Privacy and 
Surveillance Act or similar legislation to establish a legal framework for 
when and how geolocation information can be accessed and used. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Over time, therefore, the modern “use” of satellites has evolved into a 
“reliance” upon them, which has graduated into a “dependence,” and 
eventually generated a “vulnerability.” Potential adversaries, aware 
of the technology patterns of the United States (and others), have come 
to appreciate the suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles 
heel of the American civilian economy and its mighty military 
apparatus.369 
This article is an initial effort to frame, understand, and address the 
vulnerabilities posed to individual privacy, civil liberties, and national 
security by the satellite-smart device information nexus. The Strava 
incident, by no means an isolated example, provided a moment of 
recognition for scholars and policymakers as to the scope and contours of 
a new type of threat: a threat posed not by the direct actions of malicious 
states or groups, but by commercial interests and unaware consumers and 
policy makers. Thus, the question going forward is: how will the U.S. and 
the international community respond? 
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